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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Daniel Treisman
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University of California, Los Angeles
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Chapter
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The Architecture of Government
Rethinking Political Decentralization
, pp. 295 - 320
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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  • References
  • Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: The Architecture of Government
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