Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-lvtdw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-17T12:19:49.709Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - The bond of society

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2010

Get access

Summary

The crux remains how Adam can resist the lure of The Extra Trick and how both Hume's farmers are to get their harvests in. The problem arose initially because prudence addressed Adam in a language of forward-looking reasons, concerned solely with what would secure better consequences for him, as measured by his preferences over the possible outcomes. It advised him to take The Extra Trick if given the chance. But it also advised the equally rational Eve not to give him the chance, whether or not they had made an agreement; and, since both knew it, the trail ended sadly at The Rational Choice. Similarly, prudence told the second farmer to defect and told the first farmer to expect a defection. So they both lost their harvests ‘for want of mutual confidence and security’. Trust had become rationally impossible. The point could be blunted by embodying a one-shot game in a series or by letting third parties know how these players had behaved for future reference. But it could not be so thoroughly overcome that cooperation became the basic form of social action, while prudence remained the governing idea. So, if prudence, speaking a language of homogenised utility and forward-looking reasons, is the voice of reason itself, then there is no trust within reason and critics will be right to say that the progress of Enlightenment destroys the bond of society.

Since then, we have tried complicating the character of a rational agent so that prudence can recommend indirect strategies. But neither a two-tiered preference structure nor a disposition to play fair with those who play fair could overcome the lure of a better bargain.

Type
Chapter
Information
Trust within Reason , pp. 126 - 142
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×