Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-8kt4b Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-02T02:54:58.993Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Competition and market power in broadcasting: where are the rents?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Paul Seabright
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics, University of Toulouse-1
Helen Weeds
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Economics, University of Essex
Paul Seabright
Affiliation:
Université de Toulouse
Jürgen von Hagen
Affiliation:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Get access

Summary

Introduction

This chapter considers where the scarce assets are located in the broadcasting sector and what are the lessons for public interventions to prevent the abuse of market power. It focuses on what makes broadcasting different from other sectors and on the way in which recent technological advances such as digitisation may be changing the nature and distribution of scarcity rents.

It considers two hypotheses in particular: first, that falls in the cost of reproducing and transmitting information have greatly reduced entry barriers in broadcasting, meaning that market power is less of a concern, and second, that rents in broadcasting will increasingly come from control of scarce content rather than from control over means of transmission. Both hypotheses contain elements of truth but the situation is more complex than either implies on its own. The chapter goes on to look at a number of challenges for competition policy, including such issues as market definition, exclusionary practices and bundling, matters that have been brought to the fore in recent antitrust developments. It suggests that the risks attendant on these practices may be somewhat different from those that have traditionally been emphasised and proposes rules of thumb to help identify the circumstances under which they are most likely to lead to a consolidation of market power.

We begin with a summary of technological changes in broadcasting and an assessment of their impact on the nature of competition in broadcasting markets.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets
Evolving Technology and Challenges for Policy
, pp. 47 - 80
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, William and Yellen, Janet (1976) ‘Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 475–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Areeda, Phillip and Turner, Donald F. (1975) ‘Predatory pricing and related practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’, Harvard Law Review, 88, 697–733.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, Mark (1999a) ‘Price discrimination by a many-product firm’, Review of Economic Studies, 66, 151–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, Mark (1999b) ‘Competition in the pay-TV market’, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 13, 257–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, Mark and Helen Weeds (2005, revised 2006) ‘Subscription Versus Advertising-Funded Television: the case of programme quality’, University of Essex, Mimeo.
Bakos, Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik (1999) ‘Bundling information goods: pricing, profits and efficiency’, Management Science, 45, 1613–1630.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bakos, Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik (2000) ‘Bundling and competition on the internet: aggregation strategies for information goods’, Marketing Science, 19, 63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowen, Tyler (2002) Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures, Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Crampes, Claude, Carole Haritchabalet and Brune Jullien (2004, revised 2006) ‘Advertising, Competition and Entry in Media Industries’, University of Toulouse, CESifo Working Paper no. 1591.
Dixit, Avinash K. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1977) ‘Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity’, American Economic Review, 67, 297–308.Google Scholar
Frank, Robert (1999) Luxury Fever, Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Frank, Robert H. and Cook, Philip J. (1996) The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us, Penguin.Google Scholar
McAfee, Preston, McMillan, John and Whinston, Michael (1989) ‘Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling, and correlation of values’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 371–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Motta, Massimo and Michele Polo (2003) ‘Beyond the spectrum constraint: concentration and entry in the broadcasting industry’, in Baldassarri, M. and Lambertini, L. (eds.) Antitrust, Regulation and Competition, Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Rosen, Sherwin (1981) ‘The economics of superstars’, American Economic Review, 71, 845–858.Google Scholar
Salop, Steven C. (1979) ‘Monopolistic competition with outside goods’, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 141–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutton, John (1991) Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×