Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vfjqv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T17:38:31.438Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Counting heads: a theory of voter and elite behavior in patronage democracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2009

Kanchan Chandra
Affiliation:
Associate Professor in the Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University
Herbert Kitschelt
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Steven I. Wilkinson
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Get access

Summary

The observation that patronage politics and expectations of ethnic favoritism go together is supported by a well-documented consensus among scholars of patronage democracies. According to Kearney, a student of Sri Lanka: “A common expectation seems to be that a person holding a public office or other position of power will use his position for the near-exclusive benefit of his ‘own’ people, defined by kinship, community or personal loyalty” (1973: 8). According to Haroun Adamu, a student of Nigerian politics: “It is strongly believed in this country that if you do not have one of your own kin in the local, state and/or national decision-making bodies, nobody would care to take your troubles before the decision makers, much less find solutions to them” (quoted in Joseph 1987: 67). Kenneth Post's description of elections in Nigeria emphasizes much the same point: “It was rare for a man to stand for election in a constituency which did not contain the community in which he was born. It did not matter if he had been educated elsewhere and had his business interests outside the community in which he was born, so long as he regarded it as his home. He would still be a better representative for it than someone who came from outside, who could not even speak in the same tongue” (1963: 391).

Type
Chapter
Information
Patrons, Clients and Policies
Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition
, pp. 84 - 109
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×