The doctrinal development of arbitration in the United States in large measure constitutes the rediscovery and renaissance of the venerable principle of party-autonomy. This precept, in turn, certainly cannot be conceptually severed from the juridic dignity accorded to contractual agreements. It followed from the four historical propositions that deemed arbitration to be a second-tier dispute resolution methodology; that an arbitration clause was (i) neither a “free standing” contract separate and distinct from the underlying agreement embodying it, nor (ii) an agreement enjoying equal dignity with commercial contracts of whatsoever ilk.

The doctrinal development of arbitration in the United States in large measure has sought to place arbitration at the same level as judicial proceedings. As referenced, this effort, however, has been undertaken parallel with the transformation of arbitration agreements from the status of a secondary genre of a “binding” contract to one equal in all respects to enforceable commercial contracts. This transformation required sustained analysis of four rudimentary questions.

First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, is an arbitration provision severable from the remaining contract? Second, is a challenge to a contract containing an arbitration clause to be adjudicated by a judge or an arbitrator? Third, is there a federal substantive law created by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)? Fourth, is such a law applicable in state as well as federal courts? These four inquiries found final resolution on February 21, 2006, but only after first having been identified, albeit embryonically, on June 12, 1967.