By simply holding that the democratic polity may only seek to minimize demonstrable, non-consensual harm, rights turn out to be obsolete. We should confidently reject them. Accepting my theory of Justification, we bypass the need to connect liberty with the question of “who governs” us. We need not struggle over getting the square peg in the round hole. Our normative attention is rightly just on the democratic state.

In this chapter I further explore and outline this argument by considering the ramifications of rejecting rights. Admittedly, I do not explore in detail every application of this justificatory constraint. Doing so would lose sight of the proverbial forest. Rather, I highlight its salient features, examining the general way in which this re-conceptualized rubric of limited government works. To that end, this chapter is in three parts. First, I show that a turn to Justification not only avoids a “democratic deficit” but also permits a more rewarding and productive democratic debate. My account of limited government better values democracy. Second, I examine the rights to intimacy, property, and religion, rights that have particular purchase as components of the conventional private sphere. I argue that we are better off repudiating them, turning to legislative purpose. Third, I argue that theorists have unfortunately failed to realize that an appreciation of Justification renders rights obsolete.

Promoting democratic debate

By appropriately constraining democratic decision-making, rejecting rights may (hopefully) not seem so alarming.