The Communist insurrection of November 1935 in Brazil is perhaps more important because of various implications for the future than because of the real importance of the events that took place. Concerning those events, they were scarcely more than a typical military uprising (the classic Spanish pronunciamiento) both in theory and in fact. The rebellion was easily and rapidly defeated by the government of Getulio Vargas.

This pronunciamiento was, of course, very important in the history of Latin American Communism, but its importance does not stop there: it is important also from the viewpoint of the tactics and the programme of the International as a whole, not to speak of the resources it engaged in the adventure. It could be said also that the events in Brazil in 1935 marked the onset of a political attitude that henceforth would characterize that of Communists in Latin America: they would prefer systematically an alliance with a strong personality (not to speak of a strongman) rather than with an organized political party which could propose or, worse, impose independent tactics and a different and permanent leadership upon the whole alliance (or ‘front’).

Insurrection or ‘mass polities’?

The Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935 marked a turning point in its tactics and moreover in its strategy.