The Cambridge series on the Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions is built around attempts to answer two central questions: How do institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and choices; and how do institutions affect the performance of political and economic systems? The scope of the series is comparative and historical rather than international or specifically American, and the focus is positive rather than normative.

Gary Cox's work seeks to show when and explain why party became the dominant influence on voting behavior in nineteenth century England. It is path-breaking in two respects. First, whereas it has long been known that party voting among MPs increased dramatically in the second half of the nineteenth century, Cox's work is the first to document conclusively a parallel rise in party voting among voters. Second, Cox offers a novel explanation of a key nineteenth century institutional change – the centralization of legislative initiative in the Cabinet after the first Reform Act – and clarifies the important impact of this change on popular and parliamentary voting behavior. In so doing, he systematically analyzes the interaction between Victorian constituencies and their MPs and shows how this interaction was affected by the declining parliamentary powers of backbenchers and by the rapidly changing political and economic context.