This paper tries to argue that at least some alluring, trendy or fashionable problems to do with thought and language – several of which are discussed in this volume – are in fact alluring, trendy or fashionable red herrings or cul-de-sacs. I shall primarily be concerned with the ascription of thought and intelligence to non-language-users; but, en route to that, will need to brood over our ascriptions of such terms quite generally.

Allowing myself what Weiskrantz has nicely called ‘the generosity of vernacular usage’ (this volume, p. 128), I shall use ‘intelligence’ in its wide everyday sense, with no scientific or philosophical technicalities imposed upon it; an umbrella term under which we allow, or refuse to allow, some communicative or expressive or problem-solving behaviours to fall.

‘Communication’, too, will be construed very broadly: as I shall be using it here, ‘communication’ can be purposive or not, recorded or recognised or understood or not, verbal or not, conscious or not, interpreted or misinterpreted, sincere or deceptive, simple or sophisticated. In such a liberal – but also harmlessly everyday – reading of ‘communicate’, computers communicate; a scream communicates pain by expressing it; the road sign that says ‘Diversion Ahead’ may communicate very different things to a Canadian and a Briton.