Aristotle might have spoken of the faculty of soul that moves an animal in respect to its location after he dealt with sense perception, and in ii 3 it was seen that progressive motion extends to more animals than does intellection (consider the order of powers of soul in 414a31–32). But presumably since humans also have thought entering into their desire and locomotion, he has treated all the cognitive capacities before taking up those that cause voluntary motion. It would be clumsy to deal early with the voluntary motion of animals only to have to return to human voluntary motion later after the treatment of mind. And to treat phantasia first would also seem important, if this is central to the life of many animals (415a11) and even human practical thinking depends upon it (431a14–17, b6–10). Phantasia, it may be recalled, only became a topic in iii 3 in the midst of distinguishing thought from sense. Hence, the position in the text of this inquiry into capacity for progressive motion seems appropriate. Treatment of the cognitive capacities of ensouled beings is thus surrounded by inquiry into capacities for motion, that is, the nutritive capacity and the faculty for progressive motion. Moreover, this locomotive faculty may straddle faculties already considered more than is the case with the others considered. This allows Aristotle to raise some issues that lead well into the concluding chapters of the book.