Conspicuously, during the first two years of the Pacific war, despite their professed desire to establish a long-term partnership in postwar East Asia, Chongqing and Washington held only sporadic discussions of the matter. There was no consistent, regular working arrangement between American and Chinese planning staffs for the purpose of exchanging opinions on postwar issues. Consultations about postwar issues did take place between Chongqing and Washington, but these depended on the impulse and improvisation of the top leaders on both sides. In a sense, the consultations during the first two years of the Pacific war paved the way to the only wartime summit between the Chinese and American governments in Cairo in late 1943. Yet, it also proved a trying road to travel for Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek to reach the pinnacle of their wartime relationship. The different intentions of the two sides on issues like postwar territorial settlement in Asia and control of Japan really reflected a most troubling problem in their search for a long-term partnership. Namely, the two governments could not identify the same potential enemy in the Asian–Pacific region that would disturb peace in the postwar years. Chiang Kai-shek held firmly that in the postwar years the Soviet Union would be the most serious threat to China's security. Therefore, he wanted to steer Chinese–American cooperation in the direction of containing the Russians. By contrast, Roosevelt based his postwar foreign policy on continuous cooperation among the Big Four and held Moscow's good will as essential to such a regime.