Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
1. It seems a rather curious use of language to view strikes as acts of God. Why are they usually included as an excuse in a force majeure clause?
2. Posner and Rosenfield argue that the Suez Canal cases were rightly decided. Why do they argue that the carrier's obligation should not be excused? Do you find their explanation persuasive?
2.1 Suppose that the port at which a carrier is supposed to deliver its cargo is blockaded. As a result, the carrier discharges the goods at another port. Completion of the contract (that is, delivery of the goods to the original destination) would require that someone incur additional expenditures. Who should bear the additional costs, the carrier or the shipper? How would Posner and Rosenfield decide that matter?
2.2 In fact, contracts for ocean shipping of grain routinely include a War Risks clause that holds that in the event of a blockade (and related risks), the carrier who delivers to a safe port would be paid the amount specified in the original contract, and, upon such delivery, the contract would be discharged. The shipper would be responsible for any additional costs that might be incurred by bringing the goods to their original destination. Why might this be the case?
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- Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , pp. 236 - 240Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982