Political scientists have devoted substantial energy to describing the roles played by the major political parties as well as political action committees (PACs) in funding congressional campaigns. Mirroring the assumption succinctly expressed by Madison in The Federalist Number 10 that self-interest motivates political behavior, the national parties and PACs have a strong incentive to provide financial support to their preferred candidates (Herrnson, 1989; Eismeier and Pollack, 1986a, 1986b). Under existing campaign regulations, we can readily observe similar benefit-seeking behavior among politicians, especially incumbents who attempt to exploit their office to garner financial support (Jacobson, 1989; Sabato, 1985). Although a myriad of factors may influence the ability of incumbents to acquire campaign contributions (see Munger, 1989; Poole and Romer, 1985; Gopoian, 1984), the conventional wisdom and empirical research suggest the motivation for legislators to engage in those market exchanges is primarily to protect their reelection prospects (Fiorina, 1989; Mayhew, 1974).