If the breaking of the Munich Treaty by Hitler in March 1939 meant the failure of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy, then the basic problem that emerges is whether the failure of the Munich policy changed anything and, if so, why it meant a change of British policy in the Baltic Sea region. This problem is the major concern of this chapter.

The last months of the existence of Versailles Europe were extremely difficult for British diplomacy. During this period the diplomacy of the United Kingdom was forced more than ever to undertake efforts to secure the highest interests of the state. These were described in an extract from a Foreign Office memorandum of 1926: ‘We have all we want – and maybe even more. Our only goal is to maintain what we have and to live in peace.’ The basic aim of British policy therefore remained the desire to maintain the integrity of the metropolis and the Empire. Thus British interests concerning the Baltic Sea region were determined by its level of importance for the achievement of the goal expressed in the memorandum of 1926.

From the beginning of the twenties until spring 1939 the Baltic Sea region was not a focus of British Government activity. In trying to determine the basis of the relations between Great Britain and the Baltic region in that period it is necessary to consider mainly the economic sphere.