The attempt to rebuild the statistical record of the Soviet economy in World War II may have appeared foolhardy, but the effort leaves us with some important insights.

The reconstruction presented in this book proceeded from Soviet data of production, prices, outlays, and employment. It was argued that, despite their deficiencies, such data were not arbitrary fabrications; they are meaningful (although the meaning was rarely to be found on the surface), are capable of interpretation and, if interpreted correctly, provide a sufficient foundation for statistical aggregation and economic evaluation. Soviet GNP can be measured.

The process of rebuilding the Soviet wartime national accounts has confirmed how heavy was the blow inflicted by the German invasion of 1941. Between 1940 and 1942, Soviet GNP fell by one third. By the end of the war, despite the recapture of occupied territory, recovery was far from complete.

In order to defeat the invader, the Soviet Union had to mobilise a high proportion of its diminished resources. At the peak of intensity, which came already in 1942, nearly three fifths of its national product had been committed to the war effort. At this stage, insufficient resources were left available for subsistence or replacement of either the human or the physical capital stock; living standards collapsed, and people starved.

After the peak of intensity, the Soviet Union was able to continue to increase the volume of resources devoted to the war effort while at the same time relaxing the severity of domestic mobilisation.