In the post-war period academic philosophers took an interest in Hume's moral philosophy primarily because of his critique of rationalism and his subjectivism, which could be interpreted as a proto-non-cognitivism. It is in this perspective that Hume is above all the author of one single paragraph, the one in which Hume first observes that all the common systems of morality use is-statements at the outset, and ought-statements at the end, and then asks how the latter can be conclusions from the former. This has served as an important source of inspiration for many philosophers in the present century, who have advocated is–ought and fact–value dualisms. These dualisms are to the effect that statements of the former kind cannot alone imply statements of the latter kind. For instance, factual statements alone cannot imply a value-statement. To this has often been adjoined the additional assumption that only statements of the first kind can be true or have some kind of objectivity, and that value-statements are in an important sense subjective. Hutcheson was read in the same spirit as Hume was read. For instance, Peach comments in the very instructive introduction to his edition of Illustrations that ‘it is in this controversy [with rationalism] that Hutcheson probably has the greatest interest for the present-day reader’. Furthermore, Hutcheson was seen, like Hume, as a precursor of modern emotivist theories of ethics, and according to Peach, ‘[Hutcheson] has a theory of the meaning of moral judgements that is thoroughly noncognitive’.