Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Scope of Regulatory Bargaining
- PART I EXTENDING INCOMPLETE BARGAINS FROM THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
- PART II INCOMPLETE REGULATORY BARGAINS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DEREGULATED INDUSTRIES
- 5 Deregulatory Takings and Regulatory Bargaining
- 6 Incomplete Regulatory Tariffs and Judicial Enforcement
- 7 Bargaining in Decentralized Lawmaking
- 8 Overcoming Federal–State Bargaining Failures
- 9 Conclusion: Incomplete Regulatory Bargaining and the Lessons for Judicial Review
- References
- Index of Primary Legal Authorities
- Subject Index
9 - Conclusion: Incomplete Regulatory Bargaining and the Lessons for Judicial Review
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Scope of Regulatory Bargaining
- PART I EXTENDING INCOMPLETE BARGAINS FROM THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM TO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
- PART II INCOMPLETE REGULATORY BARGAINS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DEREGULATED INDUSTRIES
- 5 Deregulatory Takings and Regulatory Bargaining
- 6 Incomplete Regulatory Tariffs and Judicial Enforcement
- 7 Bargaining in Decentralized Lawmaking
- 8 Overcoming Federal–State Bargaining Failures
- 9 Conclusion: Incomplete Regulatory Bargaining and the Lessons for Judicial Review
- References
- Index of Primary Legal Authorities
- Subject Index
Summary
Most economic theory looks to the doctrines of regulatory law as a way for agency regulators to correct for problems presented by market failure. Theories of economic regulation frequently ignore that the political process, as well as the market, does not always function perfectly. Particularly with deregulation, which changes the number, type, and frequency of interactions between firms and the government, as well as between regulatory bodies and jurisdisctions, imperfect political processes will present new challenges for regulators. Regulatory law must pay attention to questions of public governance and the process for the adoption and implementation of regulation, as well as the extent to which regulation corrects for market failures.
Bargaining insights from incomplete contracts not only provide a robust theory of the firm. Within the framework of government relations bargaining, they also provide an insightful framework for students of law, economics, and political science who are concerned with questions of public governance in deregulated markets. The primary objective of the framework is not to explain history, nor is it to critique the substantive efficiency of differing regulatory arrangements. Instead, by highlighting incentives and bargaining conditions, a bargaining approach asks a different set of questions about public law and its roles than other theories of regulation. These questions are particularly important as we begin to seriously study the law and economics of a deregulatory era and, in particular, the role of judicial review in deregulated industries.
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- Information
- Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law , pp. 233 - 240Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005