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19 - Disinterested judgments and the moral surplus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2009

Serge-Christophe Kolm
Affiliation:
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris
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Summary

ERASING SELF-INTEREST FROM JUDGMENTS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIONS: THE METHODS

The just, global distribution determined by endogenous social choice derives from individuals' conceptions of justice, and only from this part of their overall judgments. Hence, it should not be directly influenced by individuals' special relation to their own interest. Individuals' self-interested judgments should therefore be banned from the individuals' evaluations on which the global evaluation is based: the individuals'overall judgments used should be laundered for their self-interest, or individuals'non-self-interested evaluations should be singled out from their overall judgment for use in the global evaluation. Not uncommonly, individuals have a dual standard, one self-interested and the other moral and impartial, which they express in different occasions. However, individuals also often have an integrated view resting on both motives, and the relative importance they attach to them can be very varied. Individuals also have preferences favouring the situation of particular others for reasons irrelevant to impartial justice, notably the closeness of the social relation with them. This extends self-interest into self-centeredness. No practical effect results if this concerns family altruism because an individual's income is in fact her household's. Self-centeredness is more generally considered in Section 4.4, and in Chapter 21 where it will be the basis of one method of solution.

Erasing the self-interested motive in the individuals' evaluations can be done in various ways. One can analyze the structure of the overall preferences of each individual and try to discriminate among the effects of various motives for banning those of self-interest.

Type
Chapter
Information
Macrojustice
The Political Economy of Fairness
, pp. 304 - 323
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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