Over the past decade or so, the interest in African land tenure has reemerged, with the international organizations and the World Bank as the most prominent actors (World Bank, 2003). In contrast to an earlier fine focus on market imperfections and the absence of private property, the ambit of concerns is now broadened to include historical evolution of property, political institutions, and customary rules among others. These are no longer seen as inherent obstacles to growth and tenure security, but as elements to take seriously in the institutional tinkering and engineering. The more comprehensive approach no doubt captures the complexity of property more adequately. However, this thinking privileges a perspective where institutions of public authority issue and enforce rules, and where rules condition behavior. My argument has been that it works both ways; behavior and rules also validate and recognize institutions.

Property and public authority are mutually constitutive and contingent. As a consequence, where land tenure is fluid and the range of public authorities considerable, landed property as well as political institutions become highly negotiable and the object of local politics.