INTRODUCTION

Does the organization of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies meet the electoral needs of its members? In the United States, scholars argue that if House members act strategically to further their career goals, then form will follow function. If politicians are no more or less strategic outside the United States, then this claim ought to apply elsewhere as well. That is, we ought to be able to explain legislative institutions and processes in different democracies as a function of the nature of political ambition in each country.

In this chapter I begin to explain how political ambition helps explain legislative processes and structures in Brazil. If Brazilian Deputies behaved like their U.S. counterparts and sought a long-term legislative career, then the design of the Chamber might reflect that desire. However, the reelection assumption does not accurately depict political careerism in Brazil. Consequently, no stable majority of incumbency-minded deputies ever exists in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. This impedes the institutionalization of legislative norms that would in turn enhance the status of incumbency.