Introduction

Parties debated a large number of institutional reforms in the 1910s. They analyzed the consequences of creating the secret franchise. They explored the benefits of eliminating two-stage elections for public offices. Politicians identified the merits of the popular election of governors and district administrators. They also considered replacing the proportional representation with the plurality election of legislators. Parties, however, approved only a small number and uncontroversial set of reforms.

This outcome is surprising because two conditions seemed to be ripe to enact far-reaching reforms. First, one party was in control of both branches of government. After more than two decades combating arbitrary presidents, the Republican Party (PR) triumphed in the 1909 general elections. In a field featuring only one other candidate, the PR's Ricardo Jiménez attracted the support of 71 percent of the popular vote. When Provincial Electoral Assemblies met, 91 percent of the electors voted in favor of the PR presidential and legislative candidates. Second, after two decades of political persecution, the PR could credibly claim that it would overhaul the institutional architecture of the republic.

The puzzle we resolve in this chapter is why, despite these advantages, Congress approved so little of the PR's reformist project. Sociologists would suggest that PR deputies representing plantation owners and cattle ranchers sabotaged these efforts. These deputies would oppose these reforms because they had the most to lose from genuinely competitive elections.