HOW TO EXPLAIN FREE ACTIONS?

The Problem

Suppose Jones freely chose A. Why did Jones choose A? The libertarian cannot allow there to be any prior causes that necessitated Jones to choose A. In fact, it seems, the libertarian cannot cite anything in the explanation of why Jones chose A. Thus, free libertarian choices appear to violate the PSR. In the preceding section, it was suggested that several accounts of free will might yield a way out of van Inwagen's fatalism objection to the PSR. If any of these accounts works, it will also give a way out of this objection. There were three accounts offered. The first said that a proposition of the form Jones had desire D or perhaps Jones was aware of reason R can explain why Jones chose A even if it does not necessitate it. The next suggested that Jones freely chose A can be self-explanatory. And the last suggested that Jones freely chose A for R can be self-explanatory.

A Jamesian Account

We will start by looking at the account that Jones freely chose A is self-explanatory. This account makes no mention of reasons for the choice: a free choice is self-explanatory, pure and simple.

Consider first the following claim that does involve reasons:

1. (69) A proposition of the form Jones chose A for reason R, if true, sufficiently explains why Jones chose A.

This is a claim deeply embedded in our ordinary practices of explanation: saying that an action in fact done for some reason was done for that reason sufficiently explains why the action was done.