Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition
- 1 The Legal Roots Of Presumption
- 2 Presumption and Burden of Proof
- 3 Cognitive Presumption and Truth
- 4 Validating Cognitive Presumptions
- 5 Presumption and Inquiry
- 6 Default Reasoning
- 7 Presumption and Trust
- 8 Presumption and Communication
- 9 Presumption in Science and Beyond
- 10 Specificity Prioritization and the Primacy of the Particular
- 11 Dismissing Extremely Remote Possibilities
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Names
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition
- 1 The Legal Roots Of Presumption
- 2 Presumption and Burden of Proof
- 3 Cognitive Presumption and Truth
- 4 Validating Cognitive Presumptions
- 5 Presumption and Inquiry
- 6 Default Reasoning
- 7 Presumption and Trust
- 8 Presumption and Communication
- 9 Presumption in Science and Beyond
- 10 Specificity Prioritization and the Primacy of the Particular
- 11 Dismissing Extremely Remote Possibilities
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Names
- References
Summary
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- Information
- Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition , pp. 171 - 178Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
References
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. “Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion.” In Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, edited by N. Rescher, pp. 33–54. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975; American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph, no. 9Google Scholar
. On Sophistical Refutations (De Sophisticis Elenchis), translated by E. S. Forster. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations.” Econometrica, 19 (1951): 404–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Novum Organon
. “Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis,” translated into German by A. Pringsheim as Versuch einer neuen Theorie von Glücksfällen. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1896Google Scholar
. Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundation of Common Sense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991Google Scholar
and (eds.). Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985Google Scholar
“Evidence.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., Vol. 8 (1963), pp. 905–16
. Meditations on First Philosophy, No. 1. Trans. R. M. Eaton
“Pleadings and Presumptions.” University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1973/4): 556–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Criteria for Evaluating the ‘Small’ Probability of a Catastrophic Accident from the Marine Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas.” In Risk-benefit Methodology and Application: Some Papers Presented at the Engineering Foundation Workshop, Asilomar, edited by . Los Angeles: University of California, Department of Energy and Kinetics, UCLA-ENG 7598; 1975Google Scholar
. “The Natural Ontological Attitude.” In Scientific Realism, edited by Jarret Leplin, pp. 83–107. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984Google Scholar
. “Cost-benefit Analysis and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.” Policy Sciences, 8 (1977): 177–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Trans. H. Crew and A. de Salve. Evanston: University of Illinois Press, 1914Google Scholar
, and . “Counterfactual Processing of Normal and Exceptional Events.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25 (1989): 314–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pragmatics, Implications, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: Academic Press, 1979Google Scholar
(ed.). Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, Vol. 3. Berlin: Weidmann, 1887Google Scholar
“Logic and Conversation.” In The Logic of Grammar, edited by and , pp. 64–75. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1975Google Scholar
“Is There a Logic of Discovery?” In Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. (New York: Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar
“A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals.” In IFS: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time, edited by , , and . Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981Google Scholar
Rules of Acceptances and Inductive Logic. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968; Acta Philosophica Fennica, fasc. 22)Google Scholar
“The Nuclear Controversy and the Limitations of Decision Making by Experts.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 32 (1976): 20–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Evidence.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. 10, pp. 11–21. Cambridge, 1910
. “The Sentiment of Rationality.” In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans Green, 1897Google Scholar
, and . “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives.” Psychological Review, 93 (1986): 136–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . “The Simulation Heuristic.” In Judgment under Uncertainty, edited by Daniel Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Twersky, pp. 201–8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management.” Research Paper No. 78, Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1962
“Presumptions of Reason and Presumptions of Justice.” The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973): 89–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Obligationibus: Relevastrontation einer spätmittelalterlichen Disputationstheorie. Leiden: Brill, 2001Google Scholar
, and . “Attribution Theory and Research.” Annual Review of Psychology, 31 (1980): 457–501CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961Google Scholar
. Vocabulaire de la philosophie, 9th ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962Google Scholar
“Knowledge and Justified Presumption.” Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972): 123–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Circumscription—a Form of Non-monotonic Reasoning.” Artificial Intelligence, 13 (1980): 27–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar
A Default-Logic Approach to Natural Language Presuppositions. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1987Google Scholar
“Some Observations Concerning Presumptions.” Harvard Law Review, 44 (1930–31): 906–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof.” Harvard Law Review, 47 (1933–34): 59–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1 (1974): 73–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics.” Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974): 551–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 2nd ed., translated. by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969Google Scholar
“A Theory of Defeasible Reasoning.” International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 6 (1991): 33–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Introduction and Analogy in Mathematics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954Google Scholar
, and . Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning.” Annual Review of Computer Sciences, 2 (1987): 147–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “The Illegitimacy of Cartesian Doubt.” Review of Metaphysics, 13 (1959): 226–34. Reprinted with some revisions in Essays in Philozsophical Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969)Google Scholar
. Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press, 1977Google Scholar
. Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991Google Scholar
, and . “The Primacy of Generalities in Hypothetical Reasoning.” Cognitive Psychology, 3 (1972): 268–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and . “The Importance of Universal Quantifiers in a Hypothetical Reasoning Task.” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10 (1971): 86–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and , “Self-esteem and Counterfactual Thinking,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65 (1993): 199–206CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
“Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge.” In Problems in Stoicism, edited by A. A. Long, pp. 22–37. London: Athlone Press, 1971Google Scholar
Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983Google Scholar
“The Foundation of Knowledge.” In Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer, pp. 209–27. Glencoe, Ill., 1959
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism
“Thinking by Computers” and “Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving.” In Mind and Cosmos, edited by R. E. Colodny, pp. 115–32. Pittsburgh, 1966
, et al. “Preference for Insuring against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 44 (1977): 237–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “The Psychological Burden of Proof: On the Evolutionary Development of Richard Whately's Theory of Presumption.” Communicative Monographs, 43 (1976): 115–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . “Obligations.” In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman Kretzmann, pp. 315–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Google Scholar
, and , “Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception: Thinking about What Might Have Been.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, edited by M. P. Zanna, pp. 305–31. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1990Google Scholar
, and . “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” Science, 185 (1974): 1124–131CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
, and . “Analyticity by Way of Presumption.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1982): 435–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases.” Yale Law Journal, 86 (1977): 1199–348CrossRefGoogle Scholar
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission]. An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “Chemical Compounds in Food-processing Animals. Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays of Carcinogenic Residues.” Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 20, 1979; 44 Federal Register, 17060–114
“Laws of Science and Lawlike Statements.” In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. IV edited by P. Edwards, pp. 410–14. New York: Macmillan, 1967Google Scholar
Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996Google Scholar
Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992Google Scholar
Arguments from Ignorance. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)Google Scholar
“Coherence Theory of Truth.” In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by P. Edwards 2 (1967): 130–3Google Scholar
. A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 10 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1904–1905; 3rd ed., 1940Google Scholar
. Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by T. Chadbonn. Boston: Little, Brown, 1981Google Scholar
. Reflexions sur le calcul des probabilités, art 10 [Opuscules mathématiques], Vol. 2 10ème Mémoire. Paris: David, 1761Google Scholar
. “Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion.” In Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, edited by N. Rescher, pp. 33–54. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975; American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph, no. 9Google Scholar
. On Sophistical Refutations (De Sophisticis Elenchis), translated by E. S. Forster. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations.” Econometrica, 19 (1951): 404–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Novum Organon
. “Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis,” translated into German by A. Pringsheim as Versuch einer neuen Theorie von Glücksfällen. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1896Google Scholar
. Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundation of Common Sense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991Google Scholar
and (eds.). Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985Google Scholar
“Evidence.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., Vol. 8 (1963), pp. 905–16
. Meditations on First Philosophy, No. 1. Trans. R. M. Eaton
“Pleadings and Presumptions.” University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1973/4): 556–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Criteria for Evaluating the ‘Small’ Probability of a Catastrophic Accident from the Marine Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas.” In Risk-benefit Methodology and Application: Some Papers Presented at the Engineering Foundation Workshop, Asilomar, edited by . Los Angeles: University of California, Department of Energy and Kinetics, UCLA-ENG 7598; 1975Google Scholar
. “The Natural Ontological Attitude.” In Scientific Realism, edited by Jarret Leplin, pp. 83–107. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984Google Scholar
. “Cost-benefit Analysis and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.” Policy Sciences, 8 (1977): 177–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Trans. H. Crew and A. de Salve. Evanston: University of Illinois Press, 1914Google Scholar
, and . “Counterfactual Processing of Normal and Exceptional Events.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25 (1989): 314–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pragmatics, Implications, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: Academic Press, 1979Google Scholar
(ed.). Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, Vol. 3. Berlin: Weidmann, 1887Google Scholar
“Logic and Conversation.” In The Logic of Grammar, edited by and , pp. 64–75. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1975Google Scholar
“Is There a Logic of Discovery?” In Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. (New York: Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar
“A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals.” In IFS: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time, edited by , , and . Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981Google Scholar
Rules of Acceptances and Inductive Logic. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968; Acta Philosophica Fennica, fasc. 22)Google Scholar
“The Nuclear Controversy and the Limitations of Decision Making by Experts.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 32 (1976): 20–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Evidence.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. 10, pp. 11–21. Cambridge, 1910
. “The Sentiment of Rationality.” In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans Green, 1897Google Scholar
, and . “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives.” Psychological Review, 93 (1986): 136–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . “The Simulation Heuristic.” In Judgment under Uncertainty, edited by Daniel Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Twersky, pp. 201–8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management.” Research Paper No. 78, Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1962
“Presumptions of Reason and Presumptions of Justice.” The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973): 89–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Obligationibus: Relevastrontation einer spätmittelalterlichen Disputationstheorie. Leiden: Brill, 2001Google Scholar
, and . “Attribution Theory and Research.” Annual Review of Psychology, 31 (1980): 457–501CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961Google Scholar
. Vocabulaire de la philosophie, 9th ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962Google Scholar
“Knowledge and Justified Presumption.” Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972): 123–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Circumscription—a Form of Non-monotonic Reasoning.” Artificial Intelligence, 13 (1980): 27–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar
A Default-Logic Approach to Natural Language Presuppositions. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1987Google Scholar
“Some Observations Concerning Presumptions.” Harvard Law Review, 44 (1930–31): 906–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof.” Harvard Law Review, 47 (1933–34): 59–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1 (1974): 73–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics.” Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974): 551–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 2nd ed., translated. by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969Google Scholar
“A Theory of Defeasible Reasoning.” International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 6 (1991): 33–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. Introduction and Analogy in Mathematics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954Google Scholar
, and . Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning.” Annual Review of Computer Sciences, 2 (1987): 147–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “The Illegitimacy of Cartesian Doubt.” Review of Metaphysics, 13 (1959): 226–34. Reprinted with some revisions in Essays in Philozsophical Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969)Google Scholar
. Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press, 1977Google Scholar
. Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991Google Scholar
, and . “The Primacy of Generalities in Hypothetical Reasoning.” Cognitive Psychology, 3 (1972): 268–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and . “The Importance of Universal Quantifiers in a Hypothetical Reasoning Task.” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10 (1971): 86–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and , “Self-esteem and Counterfactual Thinking,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65 (1993): 199–206CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
“Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge.” In Problems in Stoicism, edited by A. A. Long, pp. 22–37. London: Athlone Press, 1971Google Scholar
Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983Google Scholar
“The Foundation of Knowledge.” In Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer, pp. 209–27. Glencoe, Ill., 1959
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism
“Thinking by Computers” and “Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving.” In Mind and Cosmos, edited by R. E. Colodny, pp. 115–32. Pittsburgh, 1966
, et al. “Preference for Insuring against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 44 (1977): 237–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. “The Psychological Burden of Proof: On the Evolutionary Development of Richard Whately's Theory of Presumption.” Communicative Monographs, 43 (1976): 115–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . “Obligations.” In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman Kretzmann, pp. 315–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Google Scholar
, and , “Counterfactual Thinking and Social Perception: Thinking about What Might Have Been.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, edited by M. P. Zanna, pp. 305–31. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1990Google Scholar
, and . “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” Science, 185 (1974): 1124–131CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
, and . “Analyticity by Way of Presumption.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1982): 435–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases.” Yale Law Journal, 86 (1977): 1199–348CrossRefGoogle Scholar
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission]. An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “Chemical Compounds in Food-processing Animals. Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays of Carcinogenic Residues.” Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 20, 1979; 44 Federal Register, 17060–114
“Laws of Science and Lawlike Statements.” In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. IV edited by P. Edwards, pp. 410–14. New York: Macmillan, 1967Google Scholar
Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996Google Scholar
Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992Google Scholar
Arguments from Ignorance. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)Google Scholar
“Coherence Theory of Truth.” In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by P. Edwards 2 (1967): 130–3Google Scholar
. A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 10 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1904–1905; 3rd ed., 1940Google Scholar
. Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by T. Chadbonn. Boston: Little, Brown, 1981Google Scholar