For logically consistent realists, mutual deterrence games (or larger n-actor variants) are the only games in town. Realism, classical or neo-, loses much of its explanatory power if only some states are taken to be power maximizers, or if only some states are motivated by structural insecurity. As we have seen, however, logical consistency is not a hallmark of classical deterrence theory. Thus, conceptual and logical models of unilateral deterrence stand side by side in the strategic literature with models of mutual deterrence. Daniel Ellsberg's (1959: 358–359) critical risk model is a good example. In it, deterrence is seen as essentially a one-sided problem: how to deter a blackmailer, via threats, when the cost of executing the threat is prohibitive.

But Ellsberg is not alone, and it is easy to understand why: the foundations of modern deterrence theory were laid against the backdrop of the Cold War. Most strategic thinkers of that era were understandably preoccupied with the question of how the Soviet Union might be deterred from attacking Western interests (and not vice versa). Thus, it should not be surprising that the assumption of asymmetry in offensive motivation figures prominently in the strategic literature. In fact, Jervis (1979: 297) reports that “most of the literature is written from the standpoint of the country resisting change.”