In this book I argue that what is most at stake in Spinoza's thought, libertas humana (human freedom), can only be understood as the labor of human beings to become increasingly like God, a labor fraught with philosophical, theological, and political peril. Philosophically, the challenge is to understand God as neither internal nor external to human striving – neither transcendent of nor immanent in human existence – but as the continually revealed difference between human beings in bondage and human beings in freedom. This is to see, on the one hand, that human beings are most empowered in their relations with each other: “Man is God to man,” Spinoza tells us (E IV p35s). But it is also to see that the obstacles to realizing (enacting, creating) this truth are profound – rooted in nature and culture alike. Unlike traditional theistic pictures, Spinoza's view does not rule out the attainment of libertas from the outset – God is not forever beyond human grasp. But it becomes clear that placing God between human beings serves precisely to reveal how difficult (because possible) this life's work is – how unattainable God (freedom) can truly seem once human beings can no longer console themselves with the “humility” that they will never attain it.

Theologically and politically, it is to tackle several related issues. Religion, for Spinoza, means at least two things.