Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
Summary
There is a prevailing opinion that women philosophers of the seventeenth century were positively inspired by the new Cartesian conception of reason. But the writings of a number of early modern women show that a reverence for reason and dualist theories of the soul and body do not necessarily go hand in hand. Profoundly influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, these women are critical of Cartesian metaphysics and the theories it influenced, such as occasionalism, and pre-established harmony. In the 1640s, Elisabeth of Bohemia challenges Descartes' account of soul–body interaction, and develops a more extensive definition of the soul and the soul–body relationship. Following in her footsteps, Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway are opposed to the real distinction between soul and body; to the view that the soul is unextended, indivisible, and penetrable, and that material things lack life, self-motion, and perception. Although Conway's cosmology is commonly labelled as ‘spiritualist’, her system is not much different from Cavendish's ‘materialist’ philosophy. Both Conway and Cavendish defy typical seventeenth-century classifications by ascribing material attributes to spirit, and spiritual properties to matter. Mary Astell and Damaris Masham oppose the view that there is no genuine interaction between the soul and body. Despite their philosophical differences, they criticise the occasionalist philosophy of John Norris because it makes material things superfluous features of God's creation.
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- Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century , pp. 166 - 167Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003