THE VALUE OF MORAL BELIEFS

In the previous chapter, in order to motivate the fictionalist case, it was necessary to outline an argument that morality is instrumentally useful (§7.1). The first objective of this chapter is to expand on that sketch, hoping to make it more compelling. When I say that “morality” is useful, we can initially assume that what is under consideration are moral beliefs. The strategy will then be to argue that the benefits brought by moral beliefs can survive the shift to fictionalism: the attitude of acceptance can bring the same sorts of benefit. If this is not true, then the fictionalist case collapses. For a while, then, let us forget about fictionalism, and discuss again the function of moral beliefs.

One might be excused for thinking that the thesis that morality is useful has already been argued for in Chapter 6. However, the hypothesis that morality is an evolved tendency does not, in and of itself, show that it is a useful trait for individuals or for groups. Adaptations are useful to genes – specifically, whatever gene has the trait as its phenotypic effect. For instance, if the environment were reliably such that an individual's sacrificing his life would thereby ensure the maturation of several of his offspring, then such a sacrificing trait would, ceteris paribus, improve reproductive fitness. But it would in no way be useful to the individual to have that trait, and it is individuals that we are interested in.