One significant implication of the view of rationality offered in chapter 7 is that as long as an action does not stem from the kind of mental malfunction that would put the agent at increased risk of suffering harms without compensating benefits for anyone else, that person's action is subjectively rational. However, many contemporary philosophers hold that for an action to be rational in this sense, or even intelligible, it must somehow involve the judgment, by the agent, that the ends of the action are good. For example, Jonathan Dancy, Warren Quinn, Joseph Raz, and Thomas Scanlon have recently and independently presented theories according to which intentional action is action undertaken for a reason, and undertaking an action for a reason requires that one see something in the action as being of value, or as being a reason-giving feature. Not surprisingly these philosophers also hold that we have desires for reasons, at least when these desires are not simply urges that seize us. Having a desire for a reason involves, for Scanlon and for Raz, the judgment that the object of the desire is good in some way, while Quinn holds that the same sort of judgment is required in order for an action to be rational. And Dancy holds that the reasons for which an agent acts, whether good or bad, must at least be regarded by the agent as favoring the action.