In 1963 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949) commissioned a temporary working group of experts to study electricity production and distribution of electricity in wartime situations. The working group consisted of internationally distinguished electricity experts, including former TECAID-ers R. Marin (Italy) and G. Bardon (France), as well as founding members of the UCPTE W. Fleischer (FRG) and chairman J.C, van Staveren (Netherlands). After meeting five times between 1963 and 1964, the group drew two conclusions. First, they insisted they should rely upon existing forms of collaboration, and did not regard a “supranational coordinating body” as useful. Second, the group's final report concluded that there was one matter “of fundamental importance for the use of electrical power in wartime: interconnections”. Overall, it advised that the number of interconnections should increase, both at high and low voltages.

Existing cooperation and networks thus not only served economic interests and the pursuit of a “happy and peaceful future”, they were also meant to face the threat of a new conflict during the Cold War. This gave a powerful strategic and ideological twist to the potential advantages of an international interconnected network. Historian Michael Hogan has claimed that integration “was the interlocking concept in the American plan for Western Europe, the key to a large single market, a workable balance of power among the Western states, and a favorable correlation of forces on the Continent”. Although the aim of security and political stability gained prominence in the 1950s, the ERP had already endeavored in that direction. These ideals fitted with another part of U.S. strategy – that of containment– which sought to halt the spread of oppressive communist regimes. Several examples show how this was already the case with the ERP. Western European economic strength was, according to U.S. policymakers, intertwined with defensive strength and the construction and expansion of electricity networks was seen as an integral part of that strength. But internal development in Western European was not all that mattered. NATO strategy also aimed to deny electrical equipment to the Eastern block, as well as to prevent close relations between East and West in the field of electricity.