Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-c654p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-28T19:20:12.554Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

6 - The US Threat to Use Atomic Weapons

Get access

Summary

To most outside observers, the opposing forces facing each other across the Taiwan Strait during the early 1950s may have seemed unevenly matched on the side of the United States and its allies. However, asymmetric warfare can give advantages to both sides. For example, China's enormous manpower allowed it to send “human waves” in the Korean War against its United Nation's opponent. Therefore, the possibility of being forced to use atomic weapons was seriously discussed, in particular against an approaching surface and subsurface invasion force aimed at Taiwan.

During the early 1950s, atomic bombs were often thought of much like regular bombs. The use of the A-bomb was considered in Korea, and later in Vietnam during the Dien Bien Phu crisis. With regard to Taiwan, during July 1950 Truman authorized the movement of B-29 bombers to Guam. These planes were capable of carrying atomic bombs. Meanwhile, an air unit in Guam was given control of non-radioactive atomic bomb components, with the nuclear core to be provided only during an emergency. This information was leaked to the New York Times so as to give the PRC pause before they decided to attack Taiwan.

During times of crisis, planning sessions often included discussion on using atomic bombs. For example, on September 12, 1954, the NSC submitted a Top Secret paper discussing the ongoing Taiwan Strait crisis. It warned that a war with China over the offshore islands would necessarily include a sharp rise in tensions that could “probably lead to our initiating the use of atomic weapons.” Clearly, the use of atomic weapons was considered to be an important element in the defense of Taiwan.

Consideration of the nuclear option

It is still unclear whether the US government would have actually used Abombs in Korea or to halt a PRC invasion of Taiwan. In 1950, MacArthur evidently told Harriman during their talks on August 6–8 that if there were a PRC attack against Taiwan then Seventh Fleet ships, fighter jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29s, and other aircraft could destroy any invasion attempt that might be made. He further stated that it would be a one-sided battle: “Should the Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far East history.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Taiwan Straits Standoff
70 Years of PRC–Taiwan Cross-Strait Tensions
, pp. 109 - 120
Publisher: Anthem Press
First published in: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×