The 1930s saw France caught between two competing forces in regard to the Franco-German relationship: on one hand, an investment in the post-war diplomatic attempts of the 1920s to bring about genuine détente after the difficult relations caused by the war; on the other hand, a pressing need to confront the escalation of Germany's military aggression towards its neighbors, including France. The idea of fostering Franco-German rapprochement was referred to frequently in the press, as the French public and its politicians overwhelmingly supported the maintenance of peace over all other options. War still seemed unlikely by the middle of the decade and Hitler continued to spout a rhetoric of peace and rapprochement. Wagner's music played an important role in the process of working towards détente in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and in the discourse of rapprochement developed in the Parisian press from 1933. In the background, however, Germany followed a steady program of rearmament, reoccupation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland and, more generally, the dismantling of the various agreements made in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.

This period in France was characterized by the flourishing of cultural exchange initiatives and a growing appreciation of the effectiveness of “soft power” in diplomatic relations within Europe. The repair and renewal of the Franco-German diplomatic relationship following the Great War was a particular focus in the realm of cultural diplomacy. The popularity of Wagner's music in France and the importance of Wagner as a national figure for Germany made his music an obvious choice for these intercultural initiatives. The initiatives frequently took the form of visiting German per-formances of Wagner works (and orchestral excerpts) in France, which were always well received by the Parisian public and the press. The rapprochement rhetoric that surrounded them, however, was not always blindly accepted by Parisian critics. In this chapter I outline the role of Wagner's music within the broader landscape of Franco-German cultural diplomacy before turning my focus to the critical reception of these rapprochement initiatives. I disentangle critical attitudes to Wagner's music from critical responses to Furtwängler and critique of Nazi Germany, arguing that while most Parisian critics did not accept the idea of enabling rapprochement through performances of Wagner's music, they did internalize the idea of German cultural superiority, ultimately paving the way for the discourse of Franco-German collaboration under the Occupation.