After the Second World War France and the United Kingdom both pursued the same goal: to use Europe as leverage to increase their international power (Tombs 2006: 607–33). Considering the complicated history between the two nations, sharing the same objective was not going to lead to greater cooperation, but to rivalry. This trait of the Franco-British relationship is extremely important, because it has been at the centre of how the two countries have perceived each other. This rivalry should not, however, lead us to overlook how the twentieth century saw a fundamental shift in relations between the two. After centuries of enmity, short-lived alliance, rivalry and war, the 1900s ushered in a century of Franco-British peace. This complex history informs how France has approached Brexit. While it would be foolish to argue that France has tried to punish, diminish or isolate the UK, it is clear that France has been among the most straightforward member states, if not the most direct, in telling London “its four truths” (ses quatre vérités). The perception of a tough posture was so clear to all that French diplomacy tried to downplay it during the pre-referendum period and the referendum campaign. Despite popular belief, the vast majority of people in France did not want Britain to leave the European Union. Many knew that the perception of France playing hardball was only reinforcing British Eurosceptics in their rhetoric that “the Continent” was pushing the UK out of the EU.

The post-referendum period has illustrated this same tension, however. The French government has rarely lost an opportunity to tell the British that leaving the EU will have serious consequences, which they have brought upon themselves. Yet, at the same time, France did not want Brexit and has wanted to make the best out of it without jeopardizing the bilateral relationship. Managing the balance between being strong but fair and avoiding appearing tough and with a closed mind was critical for France during the period between David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech in January 2013, when he committed the Conservative Party to an in/out referendum, and Theresa May’s letter to the European Council in March 2017 triggering Article 50.