R 7525/613/7

7th September, 1940

The Macedonian Question

Encloses report (the latest of three) from Cmdr. Wolfson, A.N.A. at Istanbul on Macedonian question. Report refers to possible conversations between Macedonians and Yugoslav Government and to possibility of enlisting support of Macedonian leaders for Britain in return for unofficial assurance that their claims would be considered at peace conference; in this connexion it is suggested that M. Skavrtseff, a Macedonian leader at present in Geneva, should come to London.

(Minutes)

Commander Errington is going to send us the two reports referred to at the beginning of this memorandum. He is also sending copies of all the papers to Mr. Broad at M.E.W. In speaking to me Commander Errington was at pains to point out that the Director of Naval Intelligence regarded this paper as purely intelligence work and nothing was going to be done except through H. M. Representative at Belgrade. There are really two questions arising out of this memorandum:

• (1) Support of Macedonian aspirations. At the moment I do not think that it would be in our interest to do so. Neither Bulgaria nor Yugoslavia are completely in the Axis camp and in our present weak position I can see no useful results in trying to provoke the sort of trouble which would certainly throw both countries into Germany's arms. In the event, however, of our having to withdraw from the Balkans, support for the Macedonians might be a very useful counter to play with. Admittedly Mihailoff and the I.M.R.O. are discredited and are a party consisting only of leaders. From what we know, however, they are willing to get support from any quarter they can.

• If we were to pursue actively a proposal for a “Serb peasant -Bulgarian Agrarian” combination, it is just conceivable that circumstances might make the Macedonians a useful pawn in the game. An autonomous Macedonia within a south Slav block which had Russian support is not inconceivable.

• (2) Contact with Monsieur Skavrtseff. This seems to me a dangerous proposal, since if the Yugoslavs or Bulgarians got to know of it they would certainly suspect the worst.