‘And that is logic’

In III.1–42 Wittgenstein examines the relations of lighter and darker, whiteness, the concept of a pure saturated colour, what counts as a primary, the impossibility of transparent white, bluish yellow and reddish green, and the suggestion that people might have a different system of colours from ours. Some of his observations restate themes aired in earlier writing, some branch out in new directions. In all the remarks, however, it is fair to say that he is concerned with concepts and beliefs thoughtful persons might gravitate towards, and his efforts are directed towards clarifying what is at stake, not towards defending definite conclusions. Staying close to the text and avoiding reading into his words ideas he does not explicitly state, we see him scouting a variety of issues and assembling an agenda for himself and others to work at. There is no indication in III.1–42 how he intends to go on, but he can be expected to continue along the same lines. The next 17 remarks, III.43–59, were drafted on 28 March, the day after III.25–42 were drafted. Having raised a number of troublesome issues in III.1–42, Wittgenstein begins with three brief comments about philosophy and how he thinks it is responsibly pursued.

III.43, the first of the three remarks, states that in philosophy it is important to know ‘how’ a subject (Gegenstand) should be spoken about as well as ‘what’ should be said about it. One must, Wittgenstein says, learn first of all ‘the method of tackling’ the subject. This echoes II.11, the gist of which is that philosophers need to ask themselves how a problem should be considered so that it becomes solvable. Consider the question of the difference between greenish yellow and bluish yellow touched on at III.39–40. Adherence to Wittgenstein's method requires that we begin by figuring out whether this concerns colours or something else, pigments or lights, for example. (Note that the ‘method’ in play here, insofar as it counts as a philosophical method, is remarkably thin and very different from the substantial methods philosophers usually champion.) Then, having stressed the need to learn how a philosophical worry should be engaged, Wittgenstein observes at III.44–45 that, trivial questions aside, ‘uncertainty extends to the very roots of the problem’ and the possibility of learning something ‘totally new’ should never be excluded.