The Catalonian case is very different from the Swedish, for a number of obvious reasons. Sweden is a unitary nation- state, based on cultural homogeneity and a long shared history, but with ethnic and national minorities of different hue (Sami, Swedish Finns, Serbs, Croats, Turks, Romanians, Syrians, etc.). Most of these are geographically dissipated across Swedish territory, though the Sami have their own distinct “homeland” in the North. Catalonia, on the other hand, though also located within a formally unitary Spanish state, is an autonomous region within the national “semi- federal” structure, with its own language (Catalan), a relatively distinct history and devolved powers in questions of language, education, social policy and culture, but— in spite of this considerable political autonomy— is not equipped with the powers that uniquely distinguish a sovereign nation- state: money, foreign policy, security forces, an army and international recognition. And, importantly, it never was, in spite of multiple historical efforts (Elliott 2018; Guibernau 2004).

Its autonomous status has, moreover, shifted a lot since the fall of Franco in 1975 (the fascist regime did not admit of any autonomy at all). Autonomy peaked in 2006, but in 2010 the region had significant competences removed from the regional government in Barcelona to the central government in Madrid, based on a decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court— an event that refueled and aggravated the secessionist debate. Gerardo Munoz (2018) is right to argue that