Scandinavia arguably stands out as the only region in the world to have been associated with a history of social, economic and democratic progress for over a century. Indeed, it has been relatively spared from the curse of war and authoritarianism. Among the three countries that make up this geopolitical ensemble, Sweden holds a special position in this political imagery of a progressive, social democratic northern periphery of Europe. Through the particular historical genealogy of the Nordic and Swedish models as paragons of progress, moral qualities of social justice and solidarity, humanitarianism, equality and civic-mindedness have been attributed to these countries (Musial, 2002; Aucante, 2013a). One of the important features of the Swedish model lies in its allegedly universal welfare system: social benefits are considered to be generous and all-encompassing, they are partly tax-financed and they enjoy high support in society (Rothstein, 1998). Starting from the guarantee of a minimum standard of living, this type of welfare regime has evolved to provide extended social services, social rights and a high level of redistribution. At one point in time, it went so far as to allocate certain social goods irrespective of work or professional status, as a form of ‘decommodified’ social protection (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, high taxes and public spending have been the logical counterpart to finance this system. Therefore, the outstanding capacity of these small nations to reconcile economic performance and development with welfare and redistribution has also been key to their long-standing reputation as models.

Social democratic parties and closely associated labour unions have been another essential element of the Nordic welfare regimes. In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party has been in office for the greater part of the postwar era. For this reason, it is also a strong component of the modern political identity and image of the country, although its position is no longer as dominant as it used to be. For a long time, the party assumed the responsibility of governing alone, even when it had to rely on some degree of external support in parliament (Aucante, 2020a). Formal coalitions (with the Green Party, for instance) have now become more necessary and, since 2014, the Social Democratic cabinets headed by Stefan Löfven have been characterized by their precarious position and a dependence on painful agreements with Centre-Right parties.