The military is frequently accused of using the tactics of the last war to fight the next, a tendency that has sometimes led to disaster, for example, the Fall of France in 1940 or the more general catastrophe that befell all nations in the opening phases of the First World War (Strachan, 2005, 156–87). In both instances, failure was believed to be a consequence of military doctrines that bore little relationship to the prevailing realities of contemporary war. The modern-day military as an organization knows and understands the need to control this behavioural trait and has made a concerted effort to avoid repeating past mistakes. However, one thing that has not changed in the Western military establishment is a continued fascination with technology as a force multiplier when thinking about future conflict. This perceived obsession is strange because it feeds into a broader debate that focuses on the role played by technology in facilitating the defeat of Western militaries in a series of what might be loosely described as irregular wars since 1945 (van Creveld, 1991; Lyall and Wilson, 2008). However, despite the experience gained from two decades of war waged by Western states across the Middle East and Central Asia, the one salutary lesson learned from the war on terror, including the war against Islamic State, is that, even in irregular warfare, technology has its uses. However, it is no substitute for a strategy based on an understanding of the human domain of conflict, which is manifest in the political, ideological and economic strands of power. The challenge, then, is to ensure technology does not become a substitute for other more appropriate forms of power, which implies a more nuanced use of this capability. In a sense, the debate between technology and the operational context in which it is employed – a conventional interstate or an unconventional intra-state war has become increasingly irrelevant as recent conflicts have become hybrid in nature. This blending of conventional and unconventional is itself seen in part as a consequence of new technologies enabling non-state actors to acquire state-like military capabilities via the adaptation of commercial off-the-shelf products and services (Niam, 2014, 107–21).