This chapter is a case study of the Euro from the perspective of other federations and non-federations. In the process to monetary union (the EMU), its founders grievously neglected the rising influence of Wall St and the City of London on the major European banks. It was an inauspicious start to ignore the end of ‘financial repression’ since the 1970s, and how monetary authorities had obliged, supporting mobile capital and (reckless) bank money creation. Pixley compares the EMU, with America’s, Australia’s and Canada’s monetary unions; all have difficulties, the USA’s was possibly the most violent of the three. Today there is also the Dis-United Kingdom as a reminder that some monetary unions (mono or federal) are more to less social democratic and their central banks vary from vicious to moderately egalitarian. Chapter 3 argues conflicts over money’s value creates divisions not ameliorated or exacerbated by fiscal policies alone, but wider collective demands. Social democracy is a distinguishing mark of Europe. Canada has the loosest ‘confederation’ that could be a EU model if, say, European workers’ movements could combine on specific wage strategies (not offered in ultra-patriotic parties) and the EU Parliament agreed on fair, unified financial and bank controls.