Acerbi, C. (2002) ‘Spectral measures of risk: a coherent representation of subjective risk aversion’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(7): 1505–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Akerlof, G. (1970) ‘The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

American Academy of Actuaries (2011) On risk classification. www.actuary.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

American Council of Life Insurers (2014) Life insurers factbook. www.acli.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Anderson, C. (2008) ‘The end of theory: the data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete’, Wired, 23 June 2008. www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Armstrong, K., Weber, B., FitzGerald, G. et al. (2003) ‘Life insurance and breast cancer risk assessment: adverse selection, genetic testing decisions and discrimination’, American Journal of Medical Genetics, 120A: 359–64.Google Scholar

Arrow, K.J. (1963) ‘Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care’, American Economic Review, 53: 141–9.Google Scholar

Association of British Insurers (2005) Statement of best practice for income protection cover. www.abi.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Association of British Insurers (2011) Statement of best practice for critical illness cover. www.abi.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Association of British Insurers (2014) Life insurance – key facts 2014. www.abi.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Auerbach, A.J. and Kotlikoff, L.J. (1991) ‘The adequacy of life insurance purchases’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1: 215–41.Google Scholar

Avraham, R., Logue, K.D. and Schwarz, D. (2014) ‘Towards a universal framework for insurance anti-discrimination laws’, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 21: 1–52.Google Scholar

Babbel, D. (1985) ‘The price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance’, Journal of Finance, 40(1): 225–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Baker, R.D. and McHale, I.G. (2013) ‘Optimal betting under uncertainty: improving the Kelly criterion’, Decision Analysis, 10(3): 189–99.Google Scholar

Banthorpe, P., Cleverley, P., Fairall, C. et al. (2013) Extending the critical path. www.sias.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Baronoff, E. (2003) Risk management and insurance. John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar

Becker, G. (1992) The economic way of looking at life. Nobel Prize Lecture, www.nobelprize.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Bell, R. and Cover, T.M. (1980) ‘Competitive optimality of logarithmic investment’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 5: 161–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bell, R. and Cover, T.M. (1988) ‘Game-theoretic optimal portfolios’, Management Science, 34: 724–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Berndt, A. and Gupta, A. (2009) ‘Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 56: 725–43.Google Scholar

Bernheim, B.D., Formi, L., Gokhale, J. and Kotlikoff, L.J. (2003) ‘The mismatch between life insurance holdings and financial vulnerabilities: evidence from the health and retirement study’, American Economic Review, 93: 354–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bibby, C. (1971) T.H. Huxley on education. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Black, E. (2003) War against the weak: eugenics and America’s campaign to create a master race. Dialog Press.Google Scholar

Black, K.B., Skipper, H.D. and Black, K. (2013) Life insurance, 14th edn. Lucretian LLC.Google Scholar

Blumberg, L., Nichols, L. and Banthin, J. (2001) ‘Worker decisions to purchase health insurance’, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 1: 305–25.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Boadway, R. (1997) ‘Public economics and the theory of public policy’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 30(4a): 753–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bond, E.W. (1982) ‘A direct test of the lemons model: the market for used pickup trucks’, American Economic Review, 72(4): 836–40.Google Scholar

Bourgeon, J.M. and Picard, P. (2014) ‘Fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers’, American Economic Review, 104: 2900–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Brackenridge, R.D.C., Croxson, R.S. and Mackenzie, R. (2006) Brackenridge’s medical selection of life risks, 5th edn. Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar

Bridgeman, C. and Sandrik, K. (2008) ‘Bullshit promises’, Tennessee Law Review, 76: 379–404.Google Scholar

Buchmueller, T.C. and Ohri, S. (2006) ‘Health insurance take-up by the near-elderly’, Health Services Research, 41: 2054–73.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Butler, J.R. (1999) ‘Estimating elasticities of demand for private health insurance in Australia’, Working Paper No. 43. National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra.Google Scholar

Canadian Institute of Actuaries (2014) Statement on genetic testing and insurance. www.actuaries.ca, last accessed 21 July 2015.Google Scholar

Cardon, J.H. and Hendel, I. (2001) ‘Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey’, Rand Journal of Economics, 32: 408–27.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Carpenter, D. and Moss, D.A. (2014) Preventing regulatory capture: special interest influence and how to limit it. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Cawley, J. and Philipson, T. (1999) ‘An empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance’, American Economic Review, 89: 827–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chade, H. and Schlee, E. (2016) ‘Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling’, Working Paper. www.public.asu.edu/~hchade/papers/Exclusion_June.pdf, last accessed 23 July 2016.Google Scholar

Chernew, M., Frick, K. and McLaughlin, C. (1997) ‘The demand for health insurance coverage by low-income workers: can reduced premiums achieve full coverage?’, Health Services Research, 32: 453–70.Google Scholar

Chiappori, P.-A. (2000) ‘Econometric models of insurance under asymmetric information’, in Handbook of insurance, ed. Dionne, G. North-Holland.Google Scholar

Chiappori, P.-A. and Salanie, B. (1997) ‘Empirical contract theory: the case of insurance data’, European Economic Review, 41: 943–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Chiappori, P.-A. and Salanie, B. (2000) ‘Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets’, Journal of Political Economy, 108: 56–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cohen, A. (2005) ‘Asymmetric information and learning in the automobile insurance market’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 87: 197–207.Google Scholar

Cohen, A. and Siegelman, P. (2010) ‘Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77: 39–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Confused.com (2013) Gender gap opens on car cover costs. www.confused.com, last accessed 9 November 2014.Google Scholar

Cosmides, L., Clark Bennett, H. and Tooby, J. (2010) ‘Adaptive specializations, social exchange and the evolution of human intelligence’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107: 9007–14.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Cowen, T. and Tabarrok, A. (2015) ‘The end of asymmetric information?’, Cato Unbound, April 2015. www.cato-unbound.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Crocker, K.J. and Snow, A. (1986) ‘The efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry’, The Journal of Political Economy, 94: 321–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cummins, J.D. and Doherty, N.A. (2006) ‘The economics of insurance intermediaries,’ Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73(3): 359–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cummins, J.D., Smith, B.D., Vance, R.N. and VanDerhei, J.L. (1983) Risk classification in life insurance. Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Cutler, D.M. and Reber, S.J. (1998) ‘Paying for health insurance: the trade-off between competition and adverse selection’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 433–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. (1986) ‘The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, ii: applications’, The Review of Economic Studies, 53: 27–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Daykin, C.D., Akers, D.A., Macdonald, A.S. et al. (2003) ‘Genetics and insurance – some social policy issues’, British Actuarial Journal, 9: 787–874.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Daykin, C.D., Clark, P.N.S., Eves, M.J. et al. (1988) ‘The impact of HIV infection and AIDS on insurance in the United Kingdom’, Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, 115: 727–837.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

De Jong, P. and Ferris, S. (2006) ‘Adverse selection spirals’, ASTIN Bulletin, 36(2): 589–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

De Meza, D. and Webb, D.C. (2001) ‘Advantageous selection in insurance markets’, Rand Journal of Economics, 32: 249–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

De Montjoye, Y.-A., Hidalgo, C.A., Verlayen, M. and Blondel, V.D. (2013) ‘Unique in the crowd: the privacy bounds of human mobility’, Scientific Reports, 3: 1376.Google Scholar

De Montjoye, Y.-A., Radaelii, L., Singh, V.K. and Pentland, A. (2015) ‘Unique in the shopping mall: on the reidentifiability of credit card metadata’, Science, 347: 536–9.Google Scholar

Department of Health (2001) Government response to the report from the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee: genetics and insurance. HMSO.Google Scholar

De Ravin, J. and Rump, D. (1996) ‘The right to underwrite’, Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia, September 1996: 16–58.Google Scholar

Dewan, S. and Hsu, V. (2004) ‘Adverse selection in electronic markets: evidence from online stamp auctions’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(4): 497–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dionne, G., Gourieroux, C. and Vanasse, C. (2001) ‘Testing for evidence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market: a comment’, Journal of Political Economy, 109: 444–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dionne, G. and Rothschild, C.G. (2014) ‘Economic effects of risk classification bans’, Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 39: 184–221.Google Scholar

Doiron, D., Jones, G. and Savage, E. (2007) ‘Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role of self-assessed health in the demand for private health insurance’, Health Economics, 17: 317–34.Google Scholar

Doll, R. and Hill, A.B. (1954) ‘The mortality of doctors in relation to their smoking habits’, British Medical Journal, 228: 1451–5.Google Scholar

Dorfman, M.S. (2002) Introduction to risk management and insurance, 7th edn. Prentice Hall.Google Scholar

Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. and Levin, J. (2010) ‘Beyond testing: empirical models of insurance markets’, Annual Review of Economics, 2: 311–36.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

European Commission (2011) Guidelines on the application of Council Directive 2004/113/EC to insurance, in the light of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-236/09 (Test-Achats). www.ec.europa.eu, last accessed 17 August 2015.Google Scholar

Fan, J., Han, F. and Liu, H. (2014) ‘Challenges of big data analysis’, National Science Review, 1(2): 293–314.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Fang, H., Keane, M. and Silverman, D. (2008) ‘Sources of advantageous selection: evidence from the medigap insurance market’, Journal of Political Economy, 116(2): 303–50.Google Scholar

Feldstein, M.S. (1973) ‘The welfare loss of excess health insurance’, Journal of Political Economy, 81: 251–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. (2006) ‘Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence from the long-term care insurance market’, American Economic Review, 96: 938–58.Google Scholar

Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J.M. (2002) ‘Selection effects in the United Kingdom individual annuities market’, The Economic Journal, 112: 28–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J.M. (2004) ‘Adverse selection in insurance markets: policyholder evidence from the UK annuity market’, Journal of Political Economy, 112: 183–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J.M. (2014) ‘Testing for asymmetric information using ‘unused observables’ in insurance markets: evidence from the UK annuity market’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 81: 709–34.Google Scholar

Flegal, K.M., Kit, B.K., Orpana, H. and Graubard, B.I. (2013) ‘Association of all-cause mortality with overweight and obesity using standard body mass index categories: a systematic review and a meta-analysis’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 309(1): 71–82.Google Scholar

Friedland, J. (2013) Fundamentals of general insurance actuarial analysis. Society of Actuaries.Google Scholar

Galanter, M. (1974) ‘Why the “haves” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal change’, Law and Society Review, 9: 95–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gertner, N. (2012) ‘Losers’ rules’, Yale Law Journal, 122: 109–24.Google Scholar

Ghose, A. (2009) ‘Internet exchanges for used goods: an empirical analysis of trade patterns and adverse selection’, MIS Quarterly, 33(2): 263–91.Google Scholar

Gini, C. (1921) ‘Measurement of inequality of incomes’, Economic Journal, 31: 124–6.Google Scholar

Goldin, C. and Rouse, C. (2000) ‘Orchestrating impartiality: the impact of blind auditions on female musicians’, American Economic Review, 90: 715–41.Google Scholar

Goodwin, B.K. (1993) ‘An empirical analysis of the demand for multiple peril crop insurance’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75(2): 424–34.Google Scholar

Gray, R.J. and Pitts, S. (2012) Risk modelling in general insurance. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Grossman, H.I. (1979) ‘Adverse selection, dissembling, and competitive equilibrium’, Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 330–43.Google Scholar

Hall, M. (1999) ‘Restricting insurers’ use of genetic information: a guide to public policy’, North American Actuarial Journal, 3(1): 34–46.Google Scholar

Hammond, E.C. (1958) ‘Smoking and death rates: report on forty-four months of follow-up of 187,783 men’, Journal of American Medical Association, 15 March 1958: 1294–308.Google Scholar

Hao, M., Macdonald, A.S., Tapadar, P. and Thomas, R.G. (2016a) ‘Loss coverage under restricted risk classification: the case of iso-elastic demand,’ ASTIN Bulletin, 46(2): 265–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hao, M., Macdonald, A.S., Tapadar, P. and Thomas, R.G. (2016b) ‘Insurance loss coverage and social welfare’, University of Kent Working Paper. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/54235, last accessed 10 July 2016.Google Scholar

Hao, M., Tapadar, P. and Thomas, R.G. (2015) ‘Loss coverage in insurance markets: why adverse selection is not always a bad thing’, Paper presented at International Actuarial Association Colloquium, Oslo, June 2015. guythomas.org.uk, last accessed 17 April 2016.Google Scholar

Häring, N. and Douglas, N. (2013) Economists and the powerful. Anthem Press.Google Scholar

Harsanyi, J.C. (1955) ‘Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility’, Journal of Political Economy, 63: 309–21.Google Scholar

Hately, P. (2011) ‘Life in the fast lane’, The Actuary, August: 34–5.Google Scholar

Health Protection Agency (2004) ‘Cumulative data to end June 2004’, AIDS/HIV quarterly surveillance tables, 63. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Heen, M. (2009) ‘Ending Jim Crow life insurance rates’, Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, 4: 360–99.Google Scholar

Hemenway, D. (1990) ‘Propitious selection’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105: 1063–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hemenway, D. (1992) ‘Propitious selection’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 247–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hendren, N. (2013) ‘Private information and insurance rejections’, Econometrica, 81(5): 1713–62.Google Scholar

Hirshleifer, J. (1971) ‘The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity’, American Economic Review, 61: 561–74.Google Scholar

Hoinville, G., Berthoud, R. and Mackie, A.M. (1972) ‘A study of accident rates amongst motorists who passed or failed an advanced driving test’, Transport and Road Research Laboratory Report LR499. www.trl.co.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Howard, R.C.W. (2014) Genetic testing model: if underwriters had no access to known results. www.cia-ica.ca, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Hoy, M. (1982) ‘Categorizing risks in the insurance industry’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 71(10): 321–36.Google Scholar

Hoy, M. (2006) ‘Risk classification and social welfare’, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 31: 245–69.Google Scholar

Hoy, M., Orsi, F., Eisinger, F. and Moatti, J.P. (2003) ‘The impact of genetic testing on health care insurance’, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 28: 203–21.Google Scholar

Hoy, M. and Polborn, M. (2000) ‘The value of genetic information in the life insurance market’, Journal of Public Economics, 78: 235–252.Google Scholar

Hoy, M. and Witt, J. (2007) ‘Welfare effects of banning genetic information in the life insurance market: the case of BRCA1/2 genes’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74: 523–46.Google Scholar

Hudson, S. (2008) Legislation – are the underwriter’s hands tied? www.munichre.com, last accessed 9 August 2014.Google Scholar

Human Genetics Commission (2002) Inside information: balancing interests in the use of personal genetic data. Department of Health.Google Scholar

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (1999) Genetics and insurance position statement. Copy in author’s files.Google Scholar

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2001a) Response to whose hands on your genes? Consultation. www.hgc.gov.uk via www.archive.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2001b) Memorandum submitted to the Select Committee on Science and Technology. www.publications.parliament.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2010) Press release dated 7 October 2010. www.actuaries.org.uk, last accessed 20 July 2013.Google Scholar

Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1994) Insurance & superannuation risk classification policy. Copy held in author’s files.Google Scholar

Insurance Europe (formerly known as Council of European Assurers) (2011) The use of gender in insurance pricing. www.insuranceeurope.eu, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A. and Thomson, K. (1999) British social attitudes 16th report. Ashgate.Google Scholar

Just, R.E., Calvin, L. and Quiggin, J. (1999) ‘Adverse selection in crop insurance: actuarial and asymmetric information incentives’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81: 843–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking fast and slow. Allen Lane.Google Scholar

Kennedy, S.P.L., Batting, J.P., Courbould, M.C. et al. (1987) ‘Report on of the joint working party on discrimination in insurance and pensions’, Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries, 41: 271–367.Google Scholar

Kerr, M.G. (1989) ‘AIDS and the Actuary’, Journal of the Institute of Actuaries Students Society, 33: 195–231.Google Scholar

Keynes, J.M. (1936) The general theory of employment, interest and money. Macmillan.Google Scholar

Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D. and Graepel, T. (2013) ‘Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behavior’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110: 5802–5.Google Scholar

Kunreuther, H., Novemsky, N. and Kahneman, D. (2001) ‘Making low probabilities useful’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 23: 103–20.Google Scholar

Kunreuther, H., Pauly, M.V. and McMorrow, S. (2013) Insurance and behavioral economics: improving decisions in the most misunderstood industry. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Lazear, E. (2000) ‘Economic imperialism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1): 99–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Leigh, S. (1996) ‘The freedom to underwrite’, Paper presented to the Staple Inn Actuarial Society. www.sias.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Lewis, R. and Morris, A. (2012) ‘Tort law in the United Kingdom: image and reality in personal injury Compensation’, Journal of European Tort Law, 3: 1–35.Google Scholar

Li, K.C.-W. (1996) ‘The private insurance industry’s tactics against suspected homosexuals: redlining based on occupation, residence and marital status’, American Journal of Law and Medicine, 22: 477–502.Google Scholar

Life Insurance Association of Singapore (2006) Genetics and life insurance. www.bioethics-singapore.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Life Insurance Market Research Organisation (2013) Facts about life. www.limra.com, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2011) ‘“We are all different”: statistical discrimination and the right to be treated as an individual’, Journal of Ethics, 15: 47–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Macdonald, A.S. (2003) ‘Moratoria on the use of genetic tests and family history’, British Actuarial Journal, 9: 217–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Macdonald, A.S. (2004) ‘Genetics and insurance management’, in The Swedish Society of Actuaries: one hundred years, ed. Sandstrom, A. Svenska Aktuarieforeningen.Google Scholar

Macdonald, A.S. and Yu, F. (2011) ‘The impact of genetic information on the insurance industry: conclusions from the ‘bottom-up’ modelling programme’, ASTIN Bulletin, 41: 343–76.Google Scholar

Mackowiak, B. and Widerholt, M. (2011) ‘Inattention to rare events’, CEPR Working Paper 8626.Google Scholar

Maclean, L.C., Thorp, E.O. and Ziemba, W.T. (2010) ‘Long-term capital growth: the good and bad properties of the Kelly and fractional Kelly capital growth criteria’, Quantitative Finance, 10(7): 681–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Makki, S.S. and Somwaru, A. (2001) ‘Evidence of adverse selection in crop insurance’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 68: 685–708.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Manning, W.G. and Marquis, M.S. (1996) ‘Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard’, Journal of Health Economics, 15: 609–40.Google Scholar

McClelland, G., Schulze, W. and Coursey, D. (1993) ‘Insurance for low-probability hazards: a bimodal response to unlikely events’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7: 95–116.Google Scholar

McGlamery, J.G. (2009) ‘Race based underwriting and the death of burial insurance’, Connecticut Journal of Insurance Law, 15(2): 531–70.Google Scholar

Mitchell, O.S. and McCarthy, D. (2002) ‘Estimating international adverse selection in annuities’, North American Actuarial Journal, 6(4): 38–54.Google Scholar

Mitchell, O.S. and McCarthy, D. (2010) ‘International adverse selection in life insurance and annuities’, in Riding the age wave, Vol. 3, eds. Tuljapurkar, S., Chu, C., Gauthier, A., Ogawa, N. and Pool, I. Springer.Google Scholar

Miyazaki, H. (1977) ‘The rat race and internal labour markets’, Bell Journal of Economics, 8: 394–418.Google Scholar

Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Basic Books.Google Scholar

Nyman, J.A. (2003) The theory of demand for health insurance. Stanford University Press.Google Scholar

Ohlsson, E. and Johansson, B. (2010) Non-life insurance pricing with generalized linear models. Springer.Google Scholar

Oxera Consulting (2012) Why the use of age and disability matters to consumers and insurers. www.insuranceeurope.eu, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Paltrow, S.J. (2000) ‘Insurers stopped offering dual rates in the ‘60s, but didn’t tell customers’, Wall Street Journal 27 April 2000.Google Scholar

Paltrow, S.J. (2001) ‘Old memos show in black and white Metlife’s use of race to screen clients’, Wall Street Journal 24 July 2001.Google Scholar

Parodi, P. (2014) Pricing in general insurance. Chapman & Hall.Google Scholar

Pauly, M.V. (1968) ‘The economics of moral hazard: a comment’, American Economic Review, 58: 531–27.Google Scholar

Pauly, M.V. (1983) ‘More on moral hazard’, Journal of Health Economics, 2: 83.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Pauly, M.V., Withers, K.H., Viswanathan, K.S. et al. (2003) ‘Price elasticity of demand for term life insurance and adverse selection’, NBER Working Paper 9925.Google Scholar

Pfleiderer, P. (2014) ‘Chameleons: the misuse of theoretical models in finance and economics’, Stanford University Business School Working Paper No. 3020.Google Scholar

Phoenix Strategic Perspectives (2013) Survey of Canadians on privacy-related issues. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. www.priv.gc.ca, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Pope, D.G. and Sydnor, J.R. (2011) ‘Implementing anti-discrimination policies in statistical profiling models’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3: 206–31.Google Scholar

Poundstone, W. (2005) Fortune’s formula: the untold story of the scientific system that beat the casinos and Wall Street. Hill & Wang.Google Scholar

Proctor, R. (1988) Racial hygiene: medicine under the Nazis. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Proctor, R. (1999) The Nazi war on cancer. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Quiggin, J., Karagiannis, G. and Stanton, J. (1993) ‘Crop insurance and crop production: an empirical study of moral hazard and adverse selection’, Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 37(2): 95–113.Google Scholar

Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press. (Reissued edition dated 2005.)Google Scholar

Rees, R. and Wambach, A. (2008) The microeconomics of insurance. Now Publishers.Google Scholar

Riley, J.G. (1979) ‘Informational equilibrium’, Econometrica, 47: 331–59.Google Scholar

Rothschild, C. (2009) ‘Adverse selection in annuity markets: evidence from the British Life Annuity Act of 1808’, Journal of Public Economics, 93: 776–84.Google Scholar

Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. (1976) ‘Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90: 629–49.Google Scholar

Rowell, D. and Connelly, L.B. (2012) ‘A history of the term “moral hazard”’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79(4): 1051–75.Google Scholar

Saito, K. (2006) ‘Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 335–56.Google Scholar

Schatz, B. (1987) ‘The AIDS insurance crisis: underwriting or overreaching?’, Harvard Law Review, 100: 1782–825.Google Scholar

Schelling, T.C. (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Schwarcz, D. (2007) ‘Beyond disclosure: the case for banning contingent commissions’, Yale Law and Policy Review, 25: 289–336.Google Scholar

Schwarcz, D. (2009) ‘Differential compensation and the “race to the bottom” in consumer insurance markets’, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 15: 723–53.Google Scholar

Schwarze, R. and Wein, T. (2005) ‘Is the market classification of risk always efficient? Evidence from German third party motor insurance’, German Risk and Insurance Review, 4: 173–202.Google Scholar

Siegelman, P. (2004) ‘Adverse selection in insurance markets: an exaggerated threat’, Yale Law Journal, 113: 1225–71.Google Scholar

Siegelman, P. (2014) ‘Innovation and equilibrium in insurance markets with big data’, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 21: 317–38.Google Scholar

Sinclair, U. (1934) I, candidate for governor, and how I got licked, republished by University of California Press, 1994.Google Scholar

Smith, M. (2014) ‘Critical illness: can prices get any lower?’, Presentation at Institute & Faculty of Actuaries conference. www.actuaries.org.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Somerville, K. (2011) Evidence, mortality and underwriting. Swiss Re presentation, www.actuaries.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Spence, M. (1978) ‘Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets’, Journal of Public Economics, 10: 427–47.Google Scholar

Srinivasan, U. and Arunasalam, B. (2013) ‘Leveraging big data analytics to reduce healthcare costs’, IT Professional, 15(6): 21–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stigler, G.J. (1955) ‘The nature and role of originality in scientific progress’, Economica, 22: 293–302.Google Scholar

Stigler, G. (1984) ‘Economics – the imperial science?’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 86(3): 301–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Stiglitz, J.E. (2001) ‘Information and the change in the paradigm in economics’, Les Prix Nobel, 2001: 472–540. www.nobelprize.org, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Sunstein, C.R. (2002) ‘Probability neglect: emotions, worst cases, and law’, Yale Law Journal, 113: 61–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Swiss, Re (2014) Term and health watch 2013. Copy in author’s files.Google Scholar

Thomas, R.G. (2001) Genetics and insurance: an actuarial perspective with a difference. Response to consultation by the Human Genetics Commission. www.guythomas.org.uk, last accessed 17 April 2016.Google Scholar

Thomas, R.G. (2008) ‘Loss coverage as a public policy objective for risk classification schemes’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 75(4): 997–1018.Google Scholar

Thomas, R.G. (2009) ‘Demand elasticity, adverse selection and loss coverage: when can community rating work?’, ASTIN Bulletin, 39(2): 403–28.Google Scholar

Thomas, R.G. (2012) ‘Non-risk price discrimination in insurance: market outcomes and public policy’, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 37(1): 27–46.Google Scholar

Tong, S., Lloyd, L., Durrell, L. et al. (2015) ‘Provision of telematics research’, Project Report 755. www.trl.co.uk, last accessed 23 April 2016.Google Scholar

Van Hoyweghen, I. and Horstman, K. (2009) ‘Evidence-based underwriting in the molecular age: the politics of reinsurance companies towards the genetics issue’, New Genetics and Society, 28: 317–37.Google Scholar

Villeneuve, B. (2000) ‘The consequences for a monopolistic insurance firm of evaluating risk better than its customers’, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 25: 65–79.Google Scholar

Villeneuve, B. (2005) ‘Competition between insurers with superior information’, European Economic Review, 49: 321–40.Google Scholar

Viswanathan, K.S., Lemaire, J.K., Withers, K. et al. (2007) ‘Adverse selection in term life insurance purchasing due to the BRCA 1/2 genetic test and elastic demand’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74: 65–86.Google Scholar

Wang, K.C., Huang, R.J. and Tzeng, L.Y. (2009) ‘Empirical evidence for advantageous selection in the commercial fire insurance market’, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 34: 1–19.Google Scholar

Ward, D. and Zurbruegg, R. (2000) ‘Does insurance promote economic growth? Evidence from OECD countries’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67: 489–506.Google Scholar

Wilson, C. (1977) ‘A model of insurance with incomplete information’, Journal of Economic Theory, 16: 167–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ziemba, W.T. (2003) ‘Good and bad properties of the Kelly criterion’, Wilmott Magazine, March 2003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ziemba, W.T. (2015) ‘A response to Professor Paul A. Samuelson’s objections to Kelly capital growth investing’, Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(1): 153–67.Google Scholar

Zingales, L. (2013) ‘Preventing economists’ capture’, in Preventing regulatory capture: special influence and how to limit it, eds. Carpenter, D. and Moss, D. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Zweifel, P. and Eisen, R. (2012) Insurance economics. Springer.Google Scholar