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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2022

Emmanuelle Auriol
Affiliation:
Toulouse School of Economics
Claude Crampes
Affiliation:
Toulouse School of Economics
Antonio Estache
Affiliation:
Université Libre de Bruxelles
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Chapter
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Regulating Public Services
Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice
, pp. 390 - 414
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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