In this chapter I address three questions regarding civil disobedience by states. First, is state civil disobedience (henceforth, SCD) even possible, or do scholars, officials, activists, and members of the general public commit a category error when they apply the concept of civil disobedience to the actions of states? I argue for the former, while acknowledging that SCD differs in certain fundamental respects from more familiar examples of civil disobedience. Second, assuming SCD is possible, what conditions must it satisfy to be morally justifiable? Here I contend that considerations often thought to be relevant to the justifiability of civil disobedience in a domestic context, such as fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law, may frequently fail to be relevant to the justifiability of SCD. Third, are there any plausible examples of states engaging in (morally justifiable) civil disobedience? Though a number of theorists purport to have identified such cases, I argue that their conclusions rest on either a mistaken conception of civil disobedience or a failure to recognize that the illegal conduct in question does not satisfy all of the conditions necessary for an act to count as an instance of (morally justifiable) SCD. I conclude with two observations regarding theoretical reflection on SCD, and some speculation on why we are unlikely to observe any instances of it in the near future.