Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gvh9x Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T13:05:56.470Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Using Regulatory Inspection Data to Measure Environmental Compliance

from Part 2 - Quantitative Approaches to Measuring Corporate Compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2022

By
Sarah L. Stafford
Edited by
Melissa Rorie  and
Benjamin van Rooij
Melissa Rorie
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Benjamin van Rooij
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam, School of Law
Get access

Summary

Abstract: This chapter discusses how environmental inspection data can and has been used to assess regulatory compliance, focusing primarily on the US, although the issues, methods, and limitations described can apply to environmental programs in other countries with similar inspection and enforcement regimes as well as to other settings where unscheduled inspections or audits play a key role in assessing compliance. The chapter starts by describing the role of regulatory inspections in US environmental programs before explaining where to get inspection data for those programs. It next discusses the key methodological issues with and limitations in using regulatory inspections to examine compliance and provides methods for correcting for those issues. The chapter presents a brief review of empirical evidence on compliance based on studies that use inspection data, focusing primarily on evidence from the US, before concluding.

Type
Chapter
Information
Measuring Compliance
Assessing Corporate Crime and Misconduct Prevention
 , pp. 153 - 167
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alberini, Anna and Austin, David H.. 1999. Strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management: Empirical evidence from accident and spill data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 38(1), 20–48.Google Scholar
Almer, Christian and Goeschl, Timo. 2010. Environmental crime and punishment: Empirical evidence from the German Penal Code. Land Economics, 86, 707–26.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1968. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–72.Google Scholar
Blundell, Wesley, Evans, Mary, and Stafford, Sarah L.. 2020. Regulating Hazardous Wastes under U.S. Environmental Federalism: The Role of State Resources. Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Marchi, Scott and Hamilton, James T.. 2006. Assessing the accuracy of self-reported data: An evaluation of the toxics release inventory. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32, 57–76.Google Scholar
Deily, Mary and Gray, Wayne. 1991. Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 21, 260–74.Google Scholar
Earnhart, Dietrich. 2004. Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly owned treatment plants. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 655–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Mary 2016. The Clean Air Act watch list: An enforcement and compliance natural experiment. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 3(3), 627–65.Google Scholar
Evans, Mary, Liu, Lirong, and Stafford, Sarah L.. 2011. A facility-level analysis of the long-term consequences of environmental auditing among hazardous waste generators. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 40(3), 279–302.Google Scholar
Feinstein, Jonathan S. 1990. Detection controlled estimation. Journal of Law and Economics, 33(1), 233–76.Google Scholar
Friesen, Lana. 2003. Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 72–85.Google Scholar
Giles, Cynthia. 2013. Next Generation Compliance. The Environmental Forum, Environmental Law Institute, September–October.Google Scholar
Glicksman, Robert and Earnhart, Dietrich. 2007. The comparative effectiveness of government interventions on environmental performance in the chemical industry. Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 26, 317–71.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne and Shadbegian, Ronald. 2005. When and why do plants comply? Paper mills in the 1980s. Law and Policy, 27, 238–61.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne and Shadbegian, Ronald. 2007. The environmental performance of polluting plants: A spatial analysis. Journal of Regional Science, 47, 63–84.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne and Shimshack, Jay P.. 2011. The effectiveness of environmental monitoring and enforcement: A review of the empirical evidence. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 5(1), 3–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gupta, Shreekant, Saksena, Shalini, and Bari, Omer F.. 2019. Environmental enforcement and compliance in developing countries: Evidence from India. World Development, 117(C), 313–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, James T. 1996. Going by the informal book: The EPA’s use of informal rules in enforcing hazardous waste laws. Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Growth, 7, 109–55.Google Scholar
Harford, Jon and Harrington, Winston. 1991. A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics, 45, 391–5.Google Scholar
Harrington, Winston. 1988. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics, 37, 29–53.Google Scholar
Helland, Eric. 1998a. Environmental protection in the federalist system: The political economy of NPDES inspections. Economic Inquiry, 36, 305–19.Google Scholar
Helland, Eric. 1998b. The enforcement of pollution control laws: Inspections, violations, and self-reporting. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1), 141–53.Google Scholar
Heyes, Anthony. 2002. A theory of filtered enforcement. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43, 34–46.Google Scholar
Innes, Robert and Mitra, Arnab. 2015. Parties, politics, and regulation: Evidence from Clean Air Act enforcement. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 522–39.Google Scholar
Kelderman, Keene, Shaeffer, Eric, Pelton, Tom, Phillips, Ari, and Bernhardt, Courtney. 2019. The Thin Green Line: Cuts in State Pollution Control Agencies Threaten Public Health. Environmental Integrity Project: Washington, DC. https://environmentalintegrity.org/reports/the-thin-green-line/.Google Scholar
Kleit, Andrew, Pierce, Meredith, and Hill, R. Carter. 1998. Environmental protection, agency motivations, and rent extraction. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 13, 121–37.Google Scholar
Laplante, Benoit and Rilstone, Paul. 1996. Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31, 19–36.Google Scholar
Magat, Wesley A. and Kip Viscusi, W.. 1990. Effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory enforcement: The case of industrial effluent standards. The Journal of Law & Economics, 33(2), 331–60.Google Scholar
Muehlenbachs, Lucija, Staubli, Stefan, and Cohen, Mark A.. 2016. The impact of team inspections on enforcement and deterrence. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 3(1), 159–204.Google Scholar
Russell, Clifford S., Harrington, Winston, and Vaughan, William J.. 1986. Economic Models of Monitoring and Enforcement: Enforcing Pollution Control Laws. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.Google Scholar
Schaeffer, Eric and Pelton, Tom. 2019. Less Enforcement: Communities at Risk. The Environmental Integrity Project: Washington: DC. https://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/EIP-Enforcement-Report.pdf.Google Scholar
Shimshack, Jay P. 2014. The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement: A review. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 6, 339–60.Google Scholar
Shimshack, Jay and Ward, Michael B.. 2005. Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 519–40.Google Scholar
Shimshack, Jay and Ward, Michael B.. 2008. Enforcement and over-compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55(1), 90–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2002. The effect of punishment on firm compliance with hazardous waste regulations. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 290–308.Google Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2003. Assessing the effectiveness of state regulation and enforcement of hazardous waste. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 23, 27–41.Google Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2006. Rational or confused polluters? Evidence from hazardous waste compliance. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 5(1), Article 21.Google Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2007. Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 31, 83–107.Google Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2008. Self-policing in a targeted enforcement regime. Southern Economic Journal, 74, 934–51.Google Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2012. Do “carrots” work? Examining the effectiveness of EPA’s Compliance Assistance Program. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 31(3), 533–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stafford, Sarah L. 2013. How predictable are environmental compliance inspections? Journal of Regulatory Economics, 44(3), 361–88.Google Scholar
Steinway, Daniel M. 2009. Fundamentals of environmental law. In Sullivan, Thomas F. P., ed., Environmental Law Handbook. Lanham, MD: Government Institutes.Google Scholar
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2014. Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Compliance Monitoring Strategy. www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/npdescms.pdf.Google Scholar
US EPA. 2015. Compliance Monitoring Strategy for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C Program. www.epa.gov/compliance/compliance-monitoring-strategy-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act.Google Scholar
US EPA. 2016. Clean Air Act Stationary Source Compliance Monitoring Strategy. www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/cmspolicy.pdf.Google Scholar
US EPA. 2018. RF Reviewer’s Guide: Round 4 (2018–2022). www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-11/documents/srf_round_4_reviewers_guide_final_7-31-18.pdf.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×