Bibliography of Rosenthal’s Works
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2022
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- Qualitative ConsciousnessThemes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal, pp. 299 - 304Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
References
Primary Sources
(1991). The Nature of Mind, anthology, ed., with six introductory essays, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(2000). Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, ed., 2nd ed. (anthology), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 1st ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hal, 1971.Google Scholar
Secondary Sources
(2022). “Armstrong and Perception.” In Anstey, P. & Braddon-Mitchell, D. (eds), Armstrong’s Materialist Theory of the Mind (pp. 92–111), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(2021). “The Extra Ingredient.” With Brown, R. & LeDoux, J. Biology & Philosophy, published online March 14. DOI: 10.1007/s10539-021-09797-zGoogle Scholar
(2020). “Assessing Criteria for Theories.” Cognitive Neuroscience, published online November 11.Google Scholar
(2020). “Competing Models of Consciousness.” Cognitive Neuropsychology 37 (March): 176–179. doi:10.1080/02643294.2020.1736536.Google Scholar
(2019). “Chalmers’s Meta-Problem.” Special issue, Kammerer, F., Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(9–10): 194–204.Google Scholar
(2019). “Opportunities and Challenges for a Maturing Science of Consciousness.” With Michel, M., Lau, H., Fleming, S. M., et al, Nature Human Behaviour 3(2): 104–107.Google Scholar
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(2018). “Misrepresentation and Mental Appearance.” Special edition, Pereira, A., Trans/Form/Ação 41: 49–74.Google Scholar
(2018). “Subjective Inflation: Phenomenology’s Get-Rich-Quick Scheme.” With Knotts, J. D. (lead), Odegaard, B. & Lau, H. Current Opinion in Psychology 29 (October): 49–55.Google Scholar
(2018). “Seeming to Seem.” In Huebner, B. (ed.), The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett (pp. 133–164), New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(2017). “Measuring Away an Attentional Confound?.” With Morales, J., Mouradi, Y., Sergent, C., Block, N., Taschereau-Dumouchel, V., Grimaldi, P., & Lau, H., Neuroscience of Consciousness 3, 1 (August 2): nix019.Google Scholar
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(2016). “Quality Spaces, Relocation, and Grain.” In O’Shea, J. R. (ed.), Sellars and His Legacy (pp. 149–185), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(2015). “Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities.” In Coates, P. & Coleman, C. (eds), The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness (pp. 35–65), Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(2015). “Quality Space Theory in Olfaction.” In Young, B. D. & Keller, A. (eds), in the Olfactory Consciousness across Disciplines Research Topic, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, March, pp. 116–130.Google Scholar
(2014). “Consciousness Science: Real Progress and Lingering Misconceptions.” With Block, N., Carmel, D., Fleming, S. M., Kentridge, R. W., Koch, C., Lamme, V. A. F., & Lau, H., Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18, 11 (November): 566–567.Google Scholar
(2011). “Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness.” With Lau, H., Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15, 8 (August): 365–373.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
(2015). “Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy.” Untimely Reviews Series, Topoi 15, 2 (October): 541–548.Google Scholar
(2012). “Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 367, 1594 (May 19): 1424–1438.Google Scholar
(2012). “Awareness and Identification of Self.” In Liu, L. & Perry, J. (eds), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (pp. 22–50), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
(2011). “The Higher-Order View Does Not Require Consciously Self-Directed Introspection: Response to Malach.” With Lau, H., Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15, 11 (November): 508–509.Google Scholar
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(2010). “How to Think about Mental Qualities.” Philosophical Issues XX (October): 368–393.Google Scholar
(2008). “Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.” With Weisberg, J., Scholarpedia 3, 5 (4407), http://scholarpedia.org/article/Higher-order_theories_of_consciousnessGoogle Scholar
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(2006). “Experience and the Physical.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13, 10–11 (October–November): 117–128.Google Scholar
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(2004). “Being Conscious of Ourselves.” The Monist 87, 2 (April), special issue on self-consciousness, edited by José Luis Bermúdez, 159–181.Google Scholar
(2004). “Subjective Character and Reflexive Content.” Book Symposium on John Perry’s Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 1 (January): 191–198.Google Scholar
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(2002). “The Timing of Conscious States.” Consciousness and Cognition 11, 2 (June): 215–220.Google Scholar
(2002). “Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought.” Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (pp. 717–726), Macmillan Publishers.Google Scholar
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(2001). “Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.” Consciousness and Cognition 10, 1 (March): 85–93.Google Scholar
(2000). “Introspection and Self-Interpretation.” Philosophical Topics 28, 2 (Fall) (special issue on introspection): 201–233.Google Scholar
(2000). “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments.” Consciousness and Cognition 9, 2, Part 1 (June): 203–214.Google Scholar
(2000). “Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts.” Consciousness and Cognition 9, 2, Part 1 (June): 231–242.Google Scholar
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(1999). “Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story.” Philosophical Topics 26, 1 and 2 (Spring and Fall): 321–350.Google Scholar
(1999). “The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences.” In Fisette, D. (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution (pp. 95–118), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
(1998). “Consciousness and its Expression.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXII: 294–309.Google Scholar
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(1997). “Perceptual and Cognitive Models of Consciousness.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45, 3 (Summer): 740–746.Google Scholar
(1997). “Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.” Mind and Language 12, 2 (June): 206–222.Google Scholar
(1997). “Phenomenal Consciousness and What It’s Like.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, 1 (March): 64–65.Google Scholar
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(1996). “Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought.” Times of London Higher Education Supplement, April 5, p. iii.Google Scholar
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(1995). “Self-Knowledge and Moore’s Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 77, 2–3, (March): 195–209.Google Scholar
(1995). “First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy.” Philosophical Topics 22, 1 and 2 (Spring and Fall): 319–349.Google Scholar
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(1994). “The Identity Theory.” In Guttenplan, S. (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 348–355), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
(1993). “State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 2, 4 (December): 355–363.Google Scholar
(1993). “Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIII, 4 (December): 911–918.Google Scholar
(1993). “Thinking that One Thinks.” In Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. W. (eds), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays (pp. 197–223), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
(1993). “Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology VI, 2 (June): 155–167.Google Scholar
(1992). “Time and Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, 2 (June): 220–221.Google Scholar
(1992). “Consciousness, Plans, and Language.” Psycoloquy III 32 (June 3), http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000256/Google Scholar
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(1985). “Review of Perception: A Representative Theory, by Frank Jackson.” Journal of Philosophy 82, 1 (January): 28–41.Google Scholar
(1984). “The Behaviorist Concept of Mind.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7, 4 (December): 643–644.Google Scholar
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