In the Meno, Socrates considers, and replies to, Meno’s paradox. According to the paradox, whether or not one knows something, one can’t inquire into it. The paradox has been understood in a variety of ways: some think it is invalid; others think it is valid but unsound; those who favor the second option disagree about what the false premise is. I argue that, as Socrates understands the paradox (but not, perhaps, as Meno does), it is valid but unsound: not knowing doesn’t preclude inquiry, since one can inquire on the basis of true beliefs that fall short of knowledge. Socrates develops this theme in the geometrical discussion with one of Meno’s slaves. Another part of his reply is the theory of recollection, which is often thought to posit innate knowledge. I argue, however, that, though the theory of recollection posits prenatal knowledge, it doesn’t posit innate knowledge. I also set the paradox in a broader context, exploring the Meno’s views on inquiry, definition, knowledge, and belief.