In 2006 a novel and highly publicised evolution in military affairs emerged at the hands of US military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Functioning under the moniker of the Human Terrain System (HTS), it promised a fundamentally different way of approaching the perennial problem of countering violent insurgency and so establishing the conditions required for security, stability and the sorts of political change ultimately envisaged by the United States and its coalition partners. Operating as part of a radically redesigned population-centric COIN doctrine, the HTS sought to present US forces (and those of its allies) with a highly informed understanding of the structures, sentiments, loyalties and designs of the local population among whom coalition forces operated. This, it was believed, comprised perhaps the most decisive audience when seeking to win the COIN battle. Anthropologists, ethnographers and other social scientists operating in the field would provide military commanders with the necessary insights to more surgically tailor their efforts to understanding the local population, thereby enabling that vital constituency to be more accurately factored into tactical actions and operational designs. The emphasis behind this evolution was clear. Understanding the environment one operates in and in particular its socio-political structures and its ‘human terrain’ is a fundamental ingredient of success in any COIN campaign, stabilisation operation or expeditionary intervention. As the celebrated COIN expert David Kilcullen stated, there could be no substitute for analysis provided by ‘extremely deep local area and cultural knowledge’.