Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I The Economic and Monetary Union
- 1 Conceptual Foundations of Economic and Monetary Union
- 2 Theorizing Economic and Monetary Union
- 3 Monetary Union and the Single Currency
- 4 On the Misalignment of Monetary, Economic, and Political Integration in European Economic and Monetary Union
- 5 Ideas, Interests, and Power
- 6 Coping with Economic Crises through Learning by Doing
- 7 The Political Economy of Reinsurance
- 8 Euro Crises, the Productivity Slowdown, and the EMU
- Part II The Monetary Dimension
- Part III The Economic and Fiscal Dimensions
- Part IV Financial Integration
- Index
- References
5 - Ideas, Interests, and Power
Germany’s Complex Balancing Act in the Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe
from Part I - The Economic and Monetary Union
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I The Economic and Monetary Union
- 1 Conceptual Foundations of Economic and Monetary Union
- 2 Theorizing Economic and Monetary Union
- 3 Monetary Union and the Single Currency
- 4 On the Misalignment of Monetary, Economic, and Political Integration in European Economic and Monetary Union
- 5 Ideas, Interests, and Power
- 6 Coping with Economic Crises through Learning by Doing
- 7 The Political Economy of Reinsurance
- 8 Euro Crises, the Productivity Slowdown, and the EMU
- Part II The Monetary Dimension
- Part III The Economic and Fiscal Dimensions
- Part IV Financial Integration
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter draws on extensive confidential elite interviews to examine the nature and uses of German power in EMU over time and to test the explanatory power of a distinctive German ordo-liberalism in the design and operation of the euro area. Its significance derives from the role of Germany as the biggest, systematically most significant net creditor power in the European Union. The chapter argues that, in using their power in EMU negotiations, German policymakers have sought to precariously balance two intertwined sets of interests and ideas in which they are differentially embedded. On the one hand, they face an inheritance of a striking cross-party consensus on Germany’s geo-political and foreign and security policy interests and of foreign policy ideas. On the other, they are embedded in a powerful structure of German economic interests and of economic policy ideas that are believed to best serve these interests. Within these strategic parameters, federal chancellors have characteristically sought to pursue tactical flexibility. The outcome has been a dynamic equilibrium in Germany’s role in EMU that has led to a euro area whose character is far removed from the kind of ‘economic constitution’ that had been sought by German ordo-liberals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023
References
Bulmer, S., and Paterson, W. (2019). Germany and the European Union: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon? London: Red Globe Press.Google Scholar
De la Porte, C. and Jensen, M. (2021). The Next Generation EU: An analysis of the dimensions of conflict behind the deal. Social Policy and Administration 55(2), 388–402.Google Scholar
Dyson, K. (1994). Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. Harlow: Longman.Google Scholar
Dyson, K. (2009). German Bundesbank: Europeanization and the paradoxes of power. In Dyson, K. and Marcussen, M. (eds.), Central Banks in the Age of the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence, and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 131–160.Google Scholar
Dyson, K. (2021). Conservative Liberalism, Ordo-liberalism, and the State: Disciplining Democracy and the Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dyson, K., and Featherstone, K. (1999). The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dyson, K., and Quaglia, L. (2010). European Economic Governance and Policies. Volume 1: Commentary on Key Historical and Institutional Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fontan, C., and Howarth, D. (2021). The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police patrols and fire alarms. Politics and Governance 9(2), 241–251.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacker, B., and Koch, C. (2017). The Divided Eurozone: Mapping Conflicting Interests on the Reform of the Monetary Union. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.Google Scholar
Heipertz, M., and Verdun, A. (2010). Ruling Europe: The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hellmann, G. (2016). Power and followership in a crisis-ridden Europe. Global Affairs 2(1), 3–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howarth, D., and Quaglia, L. (2016). The Political Economy of European Banking Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howarth, D., and Quaglia, L. (2021). Failing forward in Economic and Monetary Union: Explaining weak eurozone financial support mechanisms. Journal of European Public Policy 28(10), 1555–1572.Google Scholar
Howarth, D. and Schild, J. (2021). Torn between two lovers: German policy on Economic and Monetary Union, the New Hanseatic League, and Franco-German bilateralism. German Politics 31(2), 323–343.Google Scholar
Issing, O. (2013). Wir brauchen die Kontrolle durch die Märkte. Handelsblatt, 22 July.Google Scholar
Kaplan, J., and Schleiminger, G. (1989). The European Payments Union. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Kornelius, S. (2013). Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World. Richmond: Alma Books.Google Scholar
Krotz, U., and Schild, J. (2013). Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism: From the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maull, H. (2000). Germany and the use of force: Still a civilian power. Survival 42(2), 56–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maull, H. (2014). Germany’s foreign policy travails: Germany’s foreign policy 1955–2014: A fairy tale success. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Pedersen, T. (2002). Cooperative hegemony: Power, ideas, and institutions in regional integration. Review of International Studies 28(4), 677–696.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Röpke, W. (1954). Internationale Ordnung – Heute. Erlenbach bei Zürich: Eugen Rentsch.Google Scholar
Schäuble, W. (2010). Why Europe’s monetary union faces its biggest crisis. Financial Times, 12 March.Google Scholar
Schäuble, W. (2021). Europe’s social peace requires a return to fiscal discipline. Financial Times, 2 June.Google Scholar
Sinn, H.-W. (2012). Die Target-Falle: Gefahren für Unser Geld und Unsere Kinder. Munich: Carl Hanser.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spohr, K. (2016). The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wasserfallen, F., et al. (2019). Analysing European Union decision-making during the eurozone crisis with new data. European Union Politics 20(1), 3–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Webber, D. (2019). European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Weidmann, J. (2020). Ordnungspolitik im digitalen Zietalter. Auszüge aus Presseartikeln, 5 February, pp. 7–12. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank.Google Scholar
Wierts, P., Van Kerkhoff, H., and de Haan, J. (2014). Composition of exports and export performance of eurozone countries. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(4), 928–941.CrossRefGoogle Scholar