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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2023

Randall G. Holcombe
Randall G. Holcombe
Affiliation:
Florida State University
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Following Their Leaders
Political Preferences and Public Policy
 , pp. 199 - 208
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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