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Chapter 19 - Delusions

from Pathological Beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2022

By
Philip R. Corlett
Edited by
Julien Musolino ,
Joseph Sommer  and
Pernille Hemmer
Julien Musolino
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Joseph Sommer
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Pernille Hemmer
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
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Summary

Delusions are false and incorrigible beliefs. They have yet to yield to psychological or neurobiological explanation. Contemporary theories attempt to bridge these levels of explanation. However, they differ in the allowable directions of influence between brain regions and psychological processes. More recently, beliefs and belief updating have fallen under the lens of social network theories. Uniting individual level accounts with those that incorporate the influence of others on ones’ beliefs may yield new avenues for treatment, that leverage key nodes in an individual’s extant social network, or that reconfigure networks to facilitate more healthful and appropriate belief formation and updating.

Keywords

delusionspriorsprediction errorreliabilitytwo-factor theory
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cognitive Science of Belief
A Multidisciplinary Approach
 , pp. 421 - 439
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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