This article contrasts the “self-interest” and “symbolic politics” explanations for the formation of mass policy preferences and voting behavior. Self-interested attitudes are defined as those supporting policies that would maximize benefits and minimize costs to the individual's private material well-being. The “symbolic politics” model emphasizes pressures to make adulthood attitudes consistent with the residues of preadult socialization. We compare the two models in terms of their ability to account for whites' opposition to busing school children for racial integration of the public schools, and the role of the busing issue in presidential voting decisions, using the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study. Regression analysis shows strong effects of symbolic attitudes (racial intolerance and political conservatism) on opposition to busing, and of the busing issue on presidential voting decisions. Self-interest (e.g., having children susceptible to busing) had no significant effect upon either. It is concluded that self-interest is often overestimated as a determinant of public opinion and voting behavior because it is too rarely directly assessed empirically.

How are patronage rewards allocated within a political machine? This article studies the distribution of 675 CETA Title I jobs within a New Haven machine. Data suggest that the jobs were used as patronage, but that patronage allocations did not follow conventionally assumed patterns of organization maintenance. Ethnic particularism overshadowed, and in fact redefined, considerations of vote-maximization and recruitment of workers. Questionnaire data suggest that those hired were not highly active politically, either before or after hiring, a finding contrary to normal suppositions about patronage recipients. The seemingly anomalous (and perhaps even counterproductive) patronage allocations become understandable, however, viewed in light of some problems and contradictions inherent in patron-client politics. These involve the inflexibility of job-based incentive systems, qualifications on assumptions of reciprocity, and the “aging” of the organization.

Modern presidents must be attentive to influences of the federal bureaucracy on their policy initiatives and all attempt some measure of bureaucratic control. This article assesses the extent of President Nixon's success in gaining some degree of management control over the bureaucracy through the manipulation of the civil service personnel system. We find that Republicans were, in fact, more likely to be selected to top career positions during the Nixon years. We find also that career executives calling themselves Independents were more likely during the Nixon years than before to resemble Republican executives in their support of Nixon's policies and goals. This is significant to presidential control because of the large number of bureaucrats calling themselves Independents. We conclude that Independent career executives may provide a president with a considerable reservoir of bureaucratic support.

This article examines the logic underlying standard formulations of the interparty competition hypothesis in the comparative state policy literature, suggests a reformulation which provides some new insights into the conditions under which we might expect state policies to change as a result of party characteristics, and undertakes an initial test of the reformulation.

I develop two propositions. The first is that party systems which divide the electorate along economic class lines will generate more generous welfare policies than party systems which do not so organize the electorate. The second is that within states with class-based electoral systems, change in welfare policy will be positively related to the degree to which the party or faction with lower- and working-class support gains control of government.

I analyze welfare policies of selected American states for the period 1938 to 1970. My analysis suggests that (1) the class basis of electoral politics does influence state welfare policies and (2) parties and factions which differ in their constituency bases produce different types of policies when they are in control of government.

The psychometric model, developed by Glendon Schubert, is a widely accepted way of conceptualizing judicial decision making. It entails the representation of justices' ideal points in a multidimensional space. A vector (representing the ordering of the justices derived from scalogram analysis) is projected through this space to aid in interpreting the underlying attitudinal dimensions of interagreement. Despite the apparent rigor of this model it contains certain indeterminacies, as no mathematical procedure has been used to determine the location of the scale vectors. Consequently ad hoc. hand procedures which may yield suboptimal solutions have been developed.

This article provides solutions for the problem of fitting scale vectors to multidimensional configurations. These solutions are developed for the problem where the scale analogue is treated at the measurement level of interval or ordinal values. In order to demonstrate the advantages of using these procedures, we undertake a reanalysis of Schubert's results (for which he used ad hoc procedures). In one-half of the cases analyzed, the results reported by Schubert are suboptimal when evaluated in terms of the coefficient he sought to maximize. The mathematical solutions and the associated computer programs give greater rigor to the psychometric model and provide a response to the criticism that scale fitting in the psychometric model is subjective and inconsistent with the premises of the behavioral approach to judicial decision making.

For the purpose of determining the relative influence of the three potentially most important social and demographic factors on party choice–social class, religion, and language–a comparison of Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland provides a “crucial experiment,” because these three variables are simultaneously present in all four countries. Building on the major earlier research achievements in comparative electoral behavior, this four-country multivariate analysis compares the indices of voting and the party choice “trees” on the basis of national sample surveys conducted in the 1970s. From this crucial contest among the three determinants of party choice, religion emerges as the victor, language as a strong runner-up, and class as a distant third. The surprising strength of the religious factor can be explained in terms of the “freezing” of past conflict dimensions in the party system and the presence of alternative, regional-federal, structures for the expression of linguistic interests.

The key hypotheses which find support in this study of the determinants of variations among the provinces of China in the provision of health and education services are: (1) that interprovincial variations in the provision of educational and health services can be explained largely by economic and ecological factors; (2) that specific levels of education and various types of medical services are responsive in different ways to changes in particular variables. For instance, the survival of cooperative health programs in the 1970s is much more sensitive to alterations in agricultural production than is the urban hospital system, which is much more dependent upon urban economic growth. This refines Dye's findings and makes them more applicable to Third World systems. (3) Central policy choices are therefore important because choices relating to investment strategy and program structure ultimately determine the relationship between the economy and the programs.

At least three competing proto-theories of Chinese military coalitional behavior (those of William Whitson, Harvey Nelsen, and William Parrish) have been proposed. This study attempts to: (1) reformulate these proto-theories into testable mathematical models, (2) test these reformulated models empirically, and (3) suggest an alternative theory of Chinese military coalitional behavior. I use causal modeling techniques to reformulate these proto-theories into mathematical ones and gather data on 423 members of the Chinese military elite to test the zero-predictions and structural equations of each model. The findings indicate that all three proto-theories may be misspecified theoretically. I then propose an alternative theory, which integrates features from all three proto-theories. This theory argues that members of the Chinese military elite form coalitions according to a set of affective ties and shared professional interests. This set of relationships is stated in mathematical terms, and the mathematical predictions deduced from it fit empirical data.

In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years 1959–1968.

The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and “high politics” IGOs were used more often than regional and “low politics” IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then explored.

The reputation of Ernst Wigforss (1881–1977), the foremost ideologist of Swedish Social Democracy, has suffered from the lack of a coherent treatment of his work in English. This article briefly surveys Wigforss' historical contributions to Swedish Social Democracy. Then it examines the structure of Wigforss' thought, analyzing first the conceptions of equality, liberty, democracy, security, economic efficiency, and solidarity that serve for Wigforss as the aims of Social Democracy. Then it considers the reformist measures Wigforss espoused to achieve these aims–social welfare policy, progressive taxation, economic planning, industrial democracy, and socialization of industry. It concludes with an assessment of Wigforss' importance as a Social Democratic theorist and suggests the relevance of his ideas to American politics and social science.

Economic determinist attempts to deduce specific political conclusions or strategies from Marx's general theory do not jibe with Marx's own extensive political activity. Instead, Marx's development as a political theorist and organizer passed from observation of (French Revolution, Chartism) or participation in (1848, the International Workingmen's Association) existing radical movements to formulation of new theories and strategies, and then to application of these strategies in subsequent movements. In applying his general theory to formulating strategies and historical explanations, Marx utilized a framework of mainly political auxiliary statements to define the specific international and national historical setting. Faced with the defeat of a strategy or a tension between the strategy and an older theory, Marx reformulated his theory in different ways, sometimes altering these auxiliary statements rather than the general theory to explain unexpected events, more rarely changing the general theory itself. These new explanations reinforced his strategies. This impact of political experience on Marx's thinking illustrates his famous definition, drawn from Theses on Feuerbach, of revolution as a “practical-critical” activity. Taken as a whole, Marx's new explanations underline the role of politics in historical materialism and conflict with Marx's general expectation that economic oppression alone would ultimately drive the proletariat to make socialist revolution.