Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T14:54:47.583Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Presidential Control of the Senior Civil Service: Assessing the Strategies of the Nixon Years*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Richard L. Cole
Affiliation:
The George Washington University
David A. Caputo
Affiliation:
Purdue University

Abstract

Modern presidents must be attentive to influences of the federal bureaucracy on their policy initiatives and all attempt some measure of bureaucratic control. This article assesses the extent of President Nixon's success in gaining some degree of management control over the bureaucracy through the manipulation of the civil service personnel system. We find that Republicans were, in fact, more likely to be selected to top career positions during the Nixon years. We find also that career executives calling themselves Independents were more likely during the Nixon years than before to resemble Republican executives in their support of Nixon's policies and goals. This is significant to presidential control because of the large number of bureaucrats calling themselves Independents. We conclude that Independent career executives may provide a president with a considerable reservoir of bureaucratic support.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1979

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

We have benefited in the preparation of this article from the thoughtful suggestions of Hugh Heclo and Richard Nathan of the Brookings Institution, Carl Stenbeig of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Hugh LeBlanc of the George Washington University, and Myron Q. Hale of Purdue University, all generous with their time and talents. We are grateful, also, to several anonymous reviewers for their many helpful suggestions, to Ms. Deborah Sines for assistance with data collecting and coding, and to George Washington University and Purdue University for research support. A special note of appreciation is due to the men and women of the federal bureaucracy who assisted by responding to our survey.

References

Aberbach, Joel D. and Rockman, Bert A. (1976). “Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch.” American Political Science Review 70: 456–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heclo, Hugh (1977). A Government of Strangers. Washington: Brookings.Google Scholar
Koenig, Louis W. (1968). The Chief Executive. New York: Harcourt, Brace.Google Scholar
Nathan, Richard P. (1975). The Plot That Failed. New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Neustadt, Richard (1960). Presidential Power. New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Nixon, Richard M. (1971a). News Conference, February 17, 1971. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1971. Washington: Government Printing Office, 158–69.Google Scholar
Nixon, Richard M. (1971b). Interview with Howard K. Smith, March 22, 1971. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1971. Washington: Government Printing Office, 448–65.Google Scholar
Rourke, Francis E. (1969). Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., (1965). A Thousand Days. New York: Fawcett.Google Scholar
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1974). Washington: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service (1976). Final Report on Violations and Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment. Washington: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Thomas, Norman C. (1970). “Presidential Advice and Information: Policy and Program Formulation.” Law and Contemporary Problems, 35:540–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar